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LABOR LAW SUCCESSORSHIP: A 
CORPORATE LAW APPROACH 
Edward B. Rock* 
and Michael L. Wachter** 
INTRODUCTION 
Courts have struggled repeatedly to define the legal obligations of 
the buyer of a business that has unionized workers. This is the domain 
of the "labor law successorship doctrine."1 Beginning with John Wi-
ley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston 2 in 1964, the Supreme Court has ad-
dressed the issue five times over the ensuing years.3 The National 
Labor Relations Board (the Board) and the lower courts have decided 
countless successorship cases. Despite or perhaps because of this con-
stant attention, many commentators have argued that the doctrine -
with its distinction among mergers, stock sales, asset sales, and shifts 
of work - is confusing, formalistic, and arbitrary.4 
• Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.S. 1977, Yale University; B.A. 1980, 
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1. For a comprehensive account, see 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 761-850 (Patrick 
Hardin ed., 3d ed. 1992). 
2. 376 U.S. 543 (1964). 
3. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987); Howard Johnson Co. 
v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974); Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 
414 U.S. 168 (1973); NLRB v. Burns Intl. Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972); John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). 
4. See, e.g .• DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, LABOR LAW IN A NUTSHELL 289-300 (3d ed. 1992) 
("Supreme Court cases on the rights of a union in successorship situations have traveled a 
twisted path reaching results that are often susceptible to manipulation by a successor employer 
who wants to rid himself of a union."); David L. Benetar, Successorship Liability Under Labor 
Agreements, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 1026, 1026 (noting a fundamental difference in judicial philoso-
phy between Wiley and Burns), 1036 (calling Wiley and Burns "decisions headed in opposite 
directions"); Sue J. Henry, Is There Arbitration After Burns?: The Resurrection of John Wiley & 
Sons, 31 VAND. L. REV. 249, 249-50 (1978) ("The development of the federal labor law dealing 
with the obligations of a successor corporate employer based upon the predecessor employer's 
collective bargaining agreement - the so-called 'successorship doctrine' - has been confusing, 
incomplete and, apparently, inconsistent.") (footnote omitted); Charles J. Morris & William 
Gaus, Successorship and the Collective Bargaining Agreement: Accommodating Wiley and Burns, 
59 VA. L. REV. 1359, 1360 (1973) ("[T]he Wiley and the Burns decisions exist at present side by 
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Critics from the labor law perspective have viewed the develop-
ment of the doctrine as largely wrong, as an unfortunate dilution of 
worker protection, and as an indefensible falling away from the pro-
tections afforded workers under Wiley. 5 The courts themselves have 
recognized the difficulties in the doctrine. 6 Commentators from a cor-
porate law perspective have been equally but oppositely perplexed, un-
able to discover any principled basis for what seems to be excessive 
worker protection. 7 
In this article, we take an approach fundamentally different from 
that of the labor law commentators. We start from a broader perspec-
tive than is common: successorship is as important an issue for corpo-
rate law as it is for labor law. Given that the two principal inputs to 
the firm are labor and capital, it would be surprising if the laws for 
labor law successorship were completely different from the laws for 
corporate law successorship. To the extent that differences exist, those 
differences should hinge upon differences between the employees' and 
the creditors' relationships with the firm. 
What distinguishes the employees' relationship from that of others 
who contract with the firm is what economists term the "internal la-
bor market" - the ongoing web of contractual and noncontractual 
understandings governing the employer-employee relationship which, 
when efficient, yields a surplus above that available in the external la-
bor market. In this article, we show that internal-labor-market theory 
provides the element that the cases and the commentary have most 
side, presenting the lower courts with the vexing task of attempting to reconcile their seemingly 
irreconcilable holdings."); Lock Holmes, Comment, Contractual Successorship: The Impact of 
Burns, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 617 (1973) ("Burns and Wiley are not easily reconciled."); Note, The 
Impact of Howard Johnson on the Labor Obligations of the Successor Employer, 74 MICH. L. 
REV. 555, 555 (1976) (noting that the Supreme Court "has reached seemingly inconsistent con-
clusions" in successorship cases). 
5. 376 U.S. at 548. See generally LESLIE, supra note 4, at 289-300; Note, The Bargaining 
Obligations of Successor Employers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 759 (1975); James Severson & Michael 
Willcoxon, Comment, Successorship Under Howard Johnson: Short Order Justice for Employees, 
64 CAL. L. REV. 795 (1976). But cf. Keith N. Hylton & Maria O. Hylton, Rent Appropriation 
and the Labor Law Doctrine of Successorship, 70 B.U. L. REV. 821 (1990) (expressing views 
consistent with those developed herein). 
6. For example, in Howard Johnson the Court stated: "The courts below recognized that the 
reasoning of Wiley was to some extent inconsistent with our more recent decision in [Burns]." 
417 U.S. at 254. The Court added: 
Particularly in light of the difficulty of the successorship question, the myriad factual cir-
cumstances and legal contexts in which it can arise, and the absence of congressional gui-
dance as to its resolution, emphasis on the facts of each case as it arises is especially 
appropriate. The Court was obviously well aware of this in Wiley, as its guarded, almost 
tentative statement of its holding amply demonstrates. 
417 U.S. at 256. 
7. RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARDS. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE 
ACQUISITIONS 1149-52 (Supp. 1993). 
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lacked: a positive theory of labor law successorship. 8 To the extent 
that one believes that courts should help parties maximize their joint 
gains, at least when doing so imposes no costs on others, the econom-
ics of internal labor markets provides a normative theory as well. 
In applying corporate law's successorship taxonomy to organize 
the labor law cases, we reach a surprising conclusion. Although the 
courts, the Board, and many labor law commentators have claimed 
that the form of the corporate transaction does not, and should not, 
matter - that "form" should not be elevated over "substance" - the 
contrary seems true. We can almost perfectly predict the outcome of 
the cases based on the corporate form of the transaction. By showing 
why the corporate form of a transaction matters in labor law, this arti-
cle provides a relatively simple, positive explanation of what hereto-
fore has been a confusing area of labor law.9 
We proceed as follows. In Part I, we provide a taxonomy of the 
background corporate law successorship doctrine, which governs the 
rights of creditors other than employees when a business is sold. In 
Part II, using a parallel taxonomy, we describe the current state of 
labor law successorship doctrine, noting the places where it diverges 
from the more general corporate law doctrine. In Part Ill, we intro-
duce and summarize the economics of internal labor markets. Finally, 
in Part IV, we use the economics of internal labor markets to under-
stand labor law successorship doctrine and to explain its unique fea-
tures. We conclude by summarizing the respective contributions that 
the form of the transaction and the dynamics of the employment rela-
tionship make to a proper understanding of successorship doctrine. 
I. SUCCESSORSHIP IN CORPORATE LAW: A TAXONOMY 
In corporate law, successorship liability issues revolve around two 
distinctions. The first distinction is between mergers and asset sales. 
State corporate law codes provide that, when two firms merge, the 
surviving firm (or the new firm) succeeds to the liabilities of the 
merged firm or firms automatically, as a matter of law.10 The same 
rule applies to sales of stock: when a firm is acquired through the 
acquisition of its stock, the firm automatically retains all prior liabili-
8. As such, our general approach resembles Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analy-
sis of American Labor Law and the Search for Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. 
L. REV. 419 (1992). 
9. Through our taxonomy we intend largely to replace the traditional labor law analysis that 
turns on the duty at issue, such as the duty to arbitrate, the duty to adhere to the contract, the 
duty to bargain, and the duty to redress unfair labor practices. 
10. See, e.g .• DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259 (1991). 
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ties because the corporation has an independent legal existence. In 
contrast, when the successor firm acquires some or all of the assets of 
the predecessor firm, the general rule is that the successor does not 
assume any liabilities, except as negotiated.1 1 As described below, the 
general rule has always been subject to exceptions, and, in recent 
years, several new exceptions have emerged. 
Why has corporate law traditionally drawn such a sharp distinc-
tion between mergers and asset sales? A core justification is a desire to 
protect creditors while minimizing transaction costs. 12 The merger 
statute provides an inexpensive, off-the-rack form to transfer a whole 
business as a going concern with minimal interruption of established 
legal and economic relationships. 13 Thus, transferring control by a 
merger or stock sale typically leaves intact all contracts, leases, and 
licenses.14 
When, on the other hand, the parties desire to transfer assets with-
out transferring the entire business as a going concern, an asset sale is 
preferable.15 Thus, if only a portion of the assets are being transferred, 
if a firm is being liquidated after business failure, or if the seller values 
some significant assets or liabilities more highly than the buyer does, 
the parties typically will choose to structure the transaction as a sale of 
assets, rather than as a merger, and identify specifically which assets 
and liabilities are transferred. 16 So long as the buyer pays fair market 
value for the assets it buys, creditors of the seller, subject to the qualifi-
cation discussed below,17 are made better off by a rule that permits the 
11. 15 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPO· 
RATIONS§ 7122 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990). 
12. See generally ROBERT c. CLARK, CoRPORATE LAW 401-61 (1986) (discussing the dis-
tinction between mergers and asset sales and describing the respective differences in legal 
consequences). 
13. The statute performs this function both when two firms of equal size merge and when a 
larger firm absorbs a smaller one. 
14. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a) (1991). 
15. The Delaware Supreme Court, for example, has drawn precisely this distinction: "A 
merger ordinarily contemplates the continuance of the enterprise and of the stockholder's invest-
ment therein, though in altered form; a sale of all assets ... ordinarily contemplates the liquida-
tion of the enterprise .... They are, in general, distinct and designed for different ends." Sterling 
v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 112 (Del. 1952). 
16. Suppose, for example, that the seller's assets include a large piece of undeveloped real 
estate which the seller's shareholders value at $2 million, but which the buyer only values at $1 
million. If the seller retains the real estate, the parties have an additional $1 million gain from 
trade to divide. In such a case, it may be cheaper to structure the transaction as an asset sale -
that is, a sale of assets other than the real estate - rather than as a merger followed by a sale of 
the real estate back to the sellers. Similarly, if the seller has a liability which it values at minus $1 
million, while the buyer believes that it is likely to cost the firm $2 million, the parties will again 
jointly maximize gains by structuring the transaction as an asset sale, leaving the liability with 
the seller while transferring everything else to the buyer. See generally DALE A. OESTERLE, 
THE LAW OF MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND REORGANIZATIONS 155-56 (1991). 
17. See infra text following note 22. 
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parties to allocate assets and liabilities to the highest valuing user. 
The value of appropriate and predictable transactional forms for 
common transactions bears emphasis. Although in theory one often 
can, with sufficient paperwork, use an asset sale to replicate a merger, 
the difficulties and costs can be significant. Securing the consent of 
third parties to an assignment of a lease or a license provides an oppor-
tunity for those parties to withhold consent. By contrast, a statutory 
merger leaves all such agreements in effect as a matter of law, absent 
contractual commitments to the contrary. 
While the legal distinction between mergers and asset sales is a 
valuable one, it provides its own opportunities for abuse. Often the 
choice of transactional form will be driven by tax considerations -
at best only marginally related to minimizing transaction costs or allo-
cating assets to the highest valuing user. Tax law accordingly seeks to 
distinguish between economically and tax-driven corporate 
reorganizations. is 
More relevant for our purposes is a second motivation. All state 
corporation codes provide for the dissolution of corporations. Tradi-
tionally, state codes have permitted corporations to dissolve and pay 
out surplus to shareholders after paying off all known creditors. New 
York's Business Corporation Law, for example, provides for a corpo-
ration's voluntary dissolution upon authorization by shareholders. 19 
After dissolution, the corporation winds up its affairs, paying off its 
creditors and distributing any surplus to shareholders.20 New York's 
statute, like most traditional corporate law statut~, bars claims of 
creditors who come forward after the statutorily mandated notice and 
claims period.21 As to known creditors, this system is satisfactory so 
long as it prevents fraudulent conveyances.22 If the asset seller re-
18. See generally BORIS I. BrITKER & JAMES s. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ch. 14 (5th ed. 1987); 2 MARTIN GINSBURG & JACK 
LEVIN, MERGERS, ACQUISmONS, AND LEVERAGED BUYOUTS 1] 609 (1993). 
19. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1001 (McKinney 1986). 
20. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 1005 (McKinney 1986). 
21. In particular, the statute provides: 
(a) At anytime after dissolution, the corporation may give a notice requiring all creditors 
and claimants, including any with unliquidated or contingent claims and any with whom the 
corporation has unfulfilled contracts, to present their claims in writing and in detail at a 
specified place and by a specified day, which shall not be less than six months after the first 
publication of such notice .... 
(b) .•. [C]laims which are not timely filed as provided in such notice except claims which 
are the subject of litigation on the date of the first publication of such notice ... shall be 
forever barred as against the corporation, its assets, directors, officers and shareholders, 
except to such extent, if any, as the court may allow them against any remaining assets of 
the corporation in the case of a creditor who shows satisfactory reason for his failure to file 
his claim as so provided. 
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 1007 (McKinney 1986). 
22. For examples of the protection against fraudulent conveyance, see the UCC's bulk trans-
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ceives fair value for the assets, existing creditors of the seller are no 
worse off and, when the seller dissolves, have an opportunity to pres-
ent their claims for payment ahead of any distributions to 
shareholders. 
But this statutory structure provides an opportunity for asset buy-
ers and sellers to share the gains of jointly externalizing risk onto un-
known future tort creditors - that is, "long-tail tort claimants." 
Suppose, for example, that Firm X makes widgets that tend to explode 
after twenty years. If Firm X continues, it will be liable for the dam-
ages the exploding widgets cause. But suppose that Firm Y buys only 
the assets of Firm X, and then Firm X dissolves after paying all cur-
rent and contingent creditors. Under the traditional corporate law 
framework, when the widgets begin to explode twenty years later, the 
victims will be without recourse. If the victims were to sue Firm Y, 
Firm Y would argue that it acquired only the assets of Firm X, not the 
liabilities, and is therefore not liable. If the victims were to sue Firm 
X, they would find that Firm X no longer exists; even if the victims 
could trace the former shareholders of X, the shareholders would ar-
gue that the law governing the dissolution of corporations bars the 
claims. Such externalization is obviously inefficient: because of asym-
metric information, the future victims cannot negotiate an appropriate 
price to bear the risk of explosion, and widget manufacturers therefore 
will not internalize the full costs of widgets. 
One solution to this problem would be to eliminate the distinction 
between mergers and asset sales with respect to liability, either in gen-
eral or with respect to unknown claimants, by adopting a rule that 
asset buyers and sellers are jointly and severally responsible for all -
or all contingent or all future - liabilities of the seller. A broad-scale 
elimination of the distinction between mergers and asset sales would 
eliminate externalization, but at the cost of interfering with the effi-
cient allocation of assets and liabilities. 
The traditional legal response has attacked the problem from this 
direction, but in a modest form. The traditional exceptions to the no-
liability rule have imposed liability on the asset purchaser when: (a) 
the purchaser expressly or implicitly agrees to assume some or all of 
the liabilities of the seller; (b) the asset sale results in a "de facto 
merger" of the selling corporation with or into the purchasing corpo-
ration; (c) the purchasing corporation is a "mere continuation" of the 
selling corporation; or (d) the transaction amounts to a fraud on the 
fer provisions, u.c.c. §§ 6-101 to 6-111 (1978), and the UNJF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE 
Acr (1985). 
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creditors. 23 
More recently, in response to the problem posed by long-tail claim-
ants and the perceived inadequacy of the traditional exceptions, some 
courts have expanded corporate successor liability in a number of di-
rections. 24 The most prominent extensions have been the "product 
line"25 and the "continuity of enterprise" exceptions.26 Under the 
product-line exception, an asset purchaser bears liability for injuries 
caused by the predecessor's products when it continues to manufac-
ture the same line of products under the same name and holds itself 
out to potential customers as the same enterprise. 27 The continuity-of-
enterprise doctrine represents an expansion of the traditional de facto 
merger exception. While the de facto merger exception requires that 
the assets be sold for stock because such a transaction is the functional 
equivalent of a statutory merger, the continuity-of-enterprise excep-
tion dispenses with that requirement on the grounds that sales for 
stock and sales for cash should receive equal treatment. 
A second, more recent approach has focused directly on the asset 
seller by modifying the dissolution provisions to provide greater pro-
tection for long-tail tort claimants. Thus, the Revised Model Business 
Corporation Act extended the claim period to five years on the as-
sumption that most of the long-tail claims would arise during that 
23. Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 78 (3d Cir. 1986); 15 FLETCHER, supra note 11, 
§§ 7122-7123.05. For a recent survey of successorship law, see Howard Sheeter, Successor Lia-
bility in Asset Acquisitions, in ACQUIRING OR SELLING THE PRIVATELY HELD COMPANY 1992, 
at 421 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Handbook Series No. 775, 1992). 
24. For important discussions of successorship liability in the product liability context, see 
Mark J. Roe, Mergers, Acquisitions and Tort: A Comment on the Problem of Successorship Corpo-
ration Liability, 70 VA. L. REv. 1559 (1984); Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Struc-
ture and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 
689, 715-18 (1985). In addition to the exceptions discussed in the text, a federal common law of 
successorship liability under CERCLA and other environmental statutes has developed. For an 
economic analysis of successorship liability under CERCLA, and a citation to the relevant cases, 
see Merrit B. Fox, Corporate Successors Under Strict Liability: A General Economic Theory and 
the Case ofCERCLA, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 183 (1991). A discussion of CERCLA is 
beyond the scope of this article. 
25. Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977); Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 
811 (N.J. 1981). 
26. Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976); see also Andrews v. 
John E. Smith's Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 781 (Ala. 1979). But see the following cases rejecting the 
"continuity of enterprise" exception: Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564 (Md. 1991); Niccum 
v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1989); Jones v. Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 320 
N.W.2d 481 (Neb. 1982); Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 451 N.E.2d 195 (N.Y. 1983); 
Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1984); Ostrowski v. Hydra-
Tool Corp., 479 A.2d 126 (Vt. 1984); Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820 (Wis. 1985). 
See also Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515 (S.D. 1986) (declining to 
apply the doctrine on the facts of the case). 
27. See cases cited supra note 25. Generally, even those courts that apply the product-line 
exception will not do so if the asset seller still exists. Conway v. White Trucks, 885 F.2d 90 (3d 
Cir. 1989). 
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period.28 
Delaware has taken a different and more innovative approach.29 
Like the traditional approach, section 281 (b) of the Delaware General 
Corporate Laws requires that a dissolving corporation make provision 
to pay all contingent, conditional, or unmatured contractual claims 
known to the corporation - the traditional rule. Section 281 (b) also 
requires, however, that a dissolving corporation 
make such provision as will be reasonably likely to be sufficient to pro-
vide compensation for claims that have not been made known, or that 
have not arisen, but that, based on facts known to the corporation ... 
are likely to arise or to become known ... prior to the expiration of an 
applicable statute of limitation. 3o 
Section 281(b) thus requires the dissolving corporation to make provi-
sion for long-tail claimants. 
Proceeding directly under section 281(b), however, poses substan-
tial risks to the directors and shareholders of the dissolving corpora-
tion because the question whether or not sufficient provision for future 
claims has been made will inevitably be litigable and judged at least 
partly by hindsight. To reduce this risk, Delaware provides an innova-
tive safe harbor procedure for complying with the mandate of section 
281(b). Under section 280, the mandate of section 28l(b) is met when, 
after notice and a number of other steps, the Chancery Court deter-
mines (1) "the amount and form of security that will be sufficient to 
provide compensation to any claimant who has rejected the [Corpora-
tion's] offer for security";31 and (2) "the amount and form of security 
which will be reasonably likely to be sufficient to provide compensa-
tion for claims that have not been made known . . . or that have not 
arisen but ... are likely to arise or to become known ... prior to the 
expiration of applicable statutes of limitation."32 
Once the corporation has posted the security required by the 
Chancery Court and paid other claims determined to be owed, it may 
distribute any remaining assets to the shareholders.33 Under these cir-
cumstances, shareholders will have no liability for any claims begun 
after the three-year winding up period established by section 278. 
28. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Ac:r § 14.07 & cmt. (ABA Comm. on Corporate 
Laws 1984) (amended 1991). The RMBCA thus leaves claimants whose claims do not arise 
within the five-year period without any protection beyond the common law exceptions. 
29. In the discussion that follows, we largely follow Chancellor Allen's path-breaking and 
penetrating discussion in In re Rego Company, No. CIV.A.11651, 1992 WL 302304 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 16, 1992). 
30. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 28l{b) (1974). 
31. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 280(c)(l) (1974) (emphasis added). 
32. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 280(c)(2) (1974) (emphasis added). 
33. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 282 (1974). 
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The Delaware procedure thus provides a mechanism for protecting 
long-tail claimants while preserving both the repose offered by the 
traditional corporate law statutes and the useful legal distinction be-
tween mergers and asset sales. To the extent that the procedure forces 
corporations to make provisions for long-tail claimants, it thereby 
blocks the attempt to impose risk on future victims without compensa-
tion while minimizing interference with the alienation of corporate 
assets. 
Both of the corporate law strategies focus primarily on the asset 
seller and the problems posed for claimants after the asset seller has 
disappeared. Modifications of the dissolution statutes address the 
problem faced by long-tail tort claimants directly. By limiting a cor-
poration's ability to dissolve and cut off future claims, these modifica-
tions help preserve long-tail tort claimants' priority over shareholders 
in the distribution of the old firm's assets. 
By contrast, both the old and the new exceptions to the general 
rule of no liability on asset purchasers take an indirect approach. By 
imposing liability on the asset purchaser, the law attempts to use the 
typically blameless asset purchaser as a conduit to impose the cost of 
risk on the original manufacturer. 34 If the asset purchaser knows that 
it will be responsible for future harm caused by the asset seller's prod-
ucts, the purchaser will internalize those costs by paying a lower price 
for the assets. 35 
Corporate law successorship doctrine can thus be summarized in 
the following two-by-two matrix: 
TAXONOMY OF CORPORATE LAW SUCCESSORSHIP DOCTRINE 
Merger/Stock Sale 
Known Claimants (1) Automatic liability 
for all obligations of 
old firm. 
Unknown Claimants (2) Automatic liability 
for all obligations of 
old firm. 
Sale of Assets 
(3) Liability for seller's obligations only if 
expressly or implicitly assumed. 
( 4) Liability for seller's obligations under 
exceptions to general rule, for example, 
express or implicit assumption, de facto 
merger, mere continuation, fraud, product 
line continuity. 
As the previous discussion demonstrates, the merger-asset sale dis-
tinction in corporate law is a formal distinction that corresponds to 
real differences in the nature and costs of transactions. At the same 
34. See Michael D. Green, Successor Liability: The Superiority of Statutory Reform to Protect 
Products Liability Claimants, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 17, 28, 40 (1986). 
35. Id. 
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time, the distinction between mergers and asset sales for liability pur-
poses provides an opportunity for socially unproductive strategic be-
havior, behavior that the courts and legislatures have attempted to 
prevent without losing the benefits of the original distinction. As we 
will demonstrate, both of these features characterize the analogous dis-
tinctions in labor law. 
II. SUCCESSORSHIP IN LABOR LAW: A TAXONOMY 
Labor law and corporate law give different meanings to the term 
successor. In corporate law, successor refers to the surviving firm that 
acquires control of the firm either through a sale of stock, a merger, or 
a sale of assets. In labor law, the term successor is generally limited to 
the asset purchaser who hires a sufficient number of the old firm's 
workers to constitute a majority of the new labor force. 36 That courts 
and commentators often use the term as a legal conclusion rather than 
as a descriptive category further complicates matters. Because of 
these different uses of the term, we will try generally to avoid it and 
use more specific and descriptive categories. 
The same two-by-two matrix that organizes the corporate law suc-
cessorship doctrines provides a basis for organizing the multifarious 
elements of labor law successorship doctrine. In this Part, we provide 
a taxonomy of the main principles of the law, while acknowledging -
largely in footnotes - those cases that depart from the general rule. 
Labor law cases, with only a few exceptions, are consistent with the 
taxonomy. This consistency may surprise labor law scholars. The la-
bor law cases frequently mention that they are elevating substance 
over form, and that the corporate form of the transaction is immate-
rial. In fact, however, one can predict the outcome of all but a few 
cases by the corporate form of the transaction. 
Labor law, like corporate law, incorporates a fundamental distinc-
tion between mergers and asset sales. In addition, the labor law suc-
cessorship cases present a third category absent from the corporate 
cases: the shift of work case. The paradigm for this third category is 
NLRB v. Burns International Security Services. 31 In that case, the 
36. Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1989), discusses the differences at length. 
The decision makes clear that the surviving firm in a stock sale is not considered a "successor" 
under labor law: "The successorship doctrine is simply inapplicable to a stock sale transac· 
tion .... 'The stock sale involves no break or hiatus between two legal entities, but is, rather, the 
continuing existence of a legal entity, albeit under new ownership.' " 887 F.2d at 751 (quoting 
TKB Intl. Corp., 240 N.L.R.B. 1082, 1083 n.4 (1979)). Instead, "(t]he successorship doctrine is 
limited to situations in which the predecessor and successor are unrelated entities and the new 
employer does not assume the contractual obligations of the prior employer. 887 F.2d at 750. 
37. 406 U.S. 272 (1972). 
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Supreme Court imposed a duty to bargain on Burns when, after dis-
placing its competitor Wackenhut in a security contract with Lock-
heed, Burns hired many of the Wackenhut employees but did not buy 
any assets from or merge with Wackenhut. 
The second major distinction in labor law is the distinction be-
tween rights deriving from a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) 
and rights deriving from the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 
Procedurally, parties litigate claims arising out of the CBA under sec-
tion 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA),38 usually 
in a proceeding in which an arbitrator interprets the CBA. Parties 
litigate claims deriving from the NLRA as unfair labor practice 
claims; the National Labor Relations Board adjudicates those claims, 
subject to appellate review. Substantively, the distinction between 
rights under the CBA and rights under the NLRA tracks other com-
mon and important distinctions: between cases that arise during the 
term of a CBA and those that arise after it has expired;39 and between 
cases that interpret the outcome of the bargaining process and cases 
involving the bargaining process itself. Labor law successorship doc-
trine, like the analogous corporate law doctrine, can usefully be cate-
gorized and clarified in a matrix incorporating these distinctions: 
38. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley), Pub. L. No. 80-101, Act § 301, 61 Stat. 
136, 156 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988)). 
39. Cases also can arise in a context in which a bargaining unit has been certified but no 
agreement has been reached on an initial contract. 
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TAXONOMY OF LABOR LAW SUCCESSORSHIP DOCTRINE 
Merger/Stock Sale Sale of Assets Shift of Work 
••••••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••• • ••••••••••••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••• 
CBA Claims (I) Obligations under (3) Asset purchaser (5) Burns-type succes· 
(LMRA § 301) the CBA automatically only assumes specified sor not obligated under 
carry over; surviving obligations. The CBA predecessor's CBA, 
firm stands in the shoes only carries forward unless adopted. Princi-
of the disappearing when the asset pur- pal case: Burns. 
firm. Principal cases: chaser explicitly or 
Wiley; constructively adopts it. 
Wiley/Interscience Substantial continuity 
labor arbitration award. provides significant but 
rebuttable evidence of 
constructive adoption. 
Principal case: Howard 
Johnson. 
••••••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••• • ••••••••••••••••••• 
NLRA Claims (2) Obligations under (4) The presumption of (6) The presumption of 
NLRA automatically continued majority sup· continued majority sup· 
carry over, both with port and the duty to port and the duty to 
respect to the presump- bargain carry over bargain carry forward 
tion of continued when more than 50% to the Burns-type sue-
majority support and of asset purchaser's cessor when more than 
the duty to bargain. bargaining unit employ- 50% of its employees 
Principal cases: ees worked for seller. worked for the old 
Esmark; Spencer Foods; Principal cases: Fall firm. Principal case: 
Miami Foundry; TKB. River; Golden State; Burns. 
Pittsburgh and Lake 
Erie R.R. Co. v. Rail-
way Labor Executives 
Assn. 
••••••••••••• • ••••••••••••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••• • ••••••••••••••••••• 
A. Preliminaries 
Two elements play important roles in the labor law successorship 
doctrines: the "duty to bargain" and the concept of "substantial con-
tinuity." Because of their importance, we pause at this point to dis-
cuss them in greater detail. 
1. The Duty To Bargain 
The duty to bargain plays a central role in the NLRA system. 
Under sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3), it is an unfair labor practice for an 
employer or a union "to refuse to bargain collectively."40 Section 8(d) 
defines collective bargaining as "the performance of the mutual obliga-
40. Labor Management Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, 141 
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(b)(3) (1988)). 
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tion of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet 
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."41 While the 
parties have an obligation to meet and confer in good faith, that obli-
gation "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. "42 
These vague but critical mandates have given rise to an extensive 
and complex jurisprudence.43 On the one hand, the Board and the 
courts have elaborated on the duty to meet, confer, and negotiate, as 
well as on the obligation to deal in good faith. On the other hand, they 
have limited the applicability of the duty to bargain to so-called 
"mandatory topics,'' specifically - drawing on the language of section 
8(d) - "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment." For most other topics, bargaining is permissive, not 
mandatory. 44 
The duty to bargain is critical for three reasons in the successor-
ship context. First, it establishes or reestablishes a bargaining relation-
ship between the employer and the union. Without it, the union has to 
engage in an organizing drive, which is typically very costly and has 
an uncertain outcome. Second, when the duty to bargain applies, the 
employer m.ust bargain with the union over mandatory topics, risking 
an economic strike if a contract cannot be signed. Moreover, the new 
employer may be unable to institute changes unilaterally in mandatory 
topics without first bargaining to impasse. 
Third, the duty to bargain forces the parties to disclose informa-
tion in certain defined contexts. When, for example, an employer 
claims that it is financially unable to meet the union's demands, it 
must corroborate such claims on request.45 Indeed, an employer's re-
fusal to supply such information may convert an economic strike into 
an unfair labor practice strike.46 The duty to bargain thus provides 
the union with a low transaction cost mechanism for reestablishing 
with the new employer the employee protections that it had achieved 
with the old employer. 
While serving these goals, however, the duty to bargain creates its 
41. 29 u.s.c. § 158(d) (1988). 
42. 29 u.s.c. § 158(d) (1988). 
43. See generally 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note l, ch. 13. 
44. On the distinction between mandatory and permissive topics, see id. ch. 16; see also First 
Natl. Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. 
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). 
45. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); Sioux City Stockyards, 293 N.L.R.B. 1 
(1989); Accurate Die Casting Co., 292 N.L.R.B. 284 (1989). 
46. NLRB v. Jarm Enters, Inc., 785 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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own opportunities for strategic behavior. Because the employer may 
not make unilateral changes even during a strike before negotiations 
reach an impasse, the duty to bargain provides a mechanism that skill-
ful negotiators may use for delay. By stringing out negotiations with 
sequential minor concessions, anecdotal evidence suggests that a party 
may delay impasse, and thereby preserve the status quo, for as much 
as two years.47 
The issue relating to the duty to bargain that is central to most of 
this article is the identification of the circumstances in which the stock 
purchaser or asset purchaser takes on a duty to bargain with the union 
that previously represented the workers. When those circumstances 
exist, the law of mandatory topics fixes the scope of that duty.48 
2. Substantial Continuity 
Critical to the different threads of the labor law successorship doc-
trines is the concept of substantial continuity. Substantial continuity 
has two elements: continuity of operations and continuity of 
workforce. The courts and the Board measure substantial continuity 
of operations by whether the purchaser has "acquired substantial as-
sets of its predecessor and continued, without interruption or substan-
tial change, the predecessor's business operations."49 In measuring 
47. The scope of the duty to bargain - that is, the determination of which topics are 
mandatory - thus becomes critical. For an economic analysis of mandatory bargaining topics in 
the relocation context, see Michael L. Wachter, The Rule Governing Relocation: The Economic 
Logic of the Supreme Court Cases (Apr. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
In developing the scope of mandatory topics, the Court has viewed the NLRA's mandate regard-
ing "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" as words of limitation. 
Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 220 (Stewart, J., concurring). Only topics that are "almost exclusively 
'an aspect of the relationship' between employer and employee" are mandatory under all circum-
stances. First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 677 (quoting Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971)). Issues involving questions of corporate 
finance, product design, advertising, and the like are always nonmandatory. A third category of 
issues - those that affect employment but also concern the "scope and direction of the enter-
prise" - are subject to a balancing test that weighs the benefits and costs of making a subject 
mandatory. First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 677. 
48. There is a related issue on which we will spend little time, namely, whether the old firm 
has a duty to bargain with the union over an owner's decision to sell its stock or a firm's decision 
to sell its assets. This question goes to the obligations of the old firm, as distinguished from our 
focus on the obligations of the new firm. 
Doctrinally, the answer is fairly clear. In general, the old firm has no obligation to bargain 
over whether to sell the firm or its assets, but it does have an obligation to bargain over the effects 
of such a decision on the employees. First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 677 n.15. On the 
other hand, bargaining would be required if the union proposed increased employment security in 
the form of a "successor and assigns" clause during negotiations over a new contract when no 
offer was outstanding. Because such a provision may give the union a right to an injunction 
against a sale to a purchaser who does not agree to be bound by the old collective bargaining 
agreement (CBA), see Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 
258 n.3 (1973), it can force a predecessor firm to bargain with the union about a future sale of 
stock or assets. 
49. Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 184 (1973). 
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substantial continuity of operations, the NLRB examines a number of 
factors. These include: 
whether the business of both employers is essentially the same; whether 
the employees of the new company are doing the same jobs in the same 
working conditions under the same supervisors; and whether the new 
entity has the same production process, produces the same products, and 
basically has the same body of customers. so 
Substantial continuity of workforce depends on what proportion of the 
new employer's workforce was employed by the old employer.st 
In the labor economics literature, the substantial continuity test 
closely parallels the situations in which the internal labor market is 
unchanged. s2 John Dunlop, and later Peter Doeringer and Michael 
Piore, used these factors to define the internal labor market of the firm 
as "an administrative unit . . . within which the pricing and allocation 
of labor is governed by a set of administrative rules and procedures."S3 
Similarly, Michael Wachter and Randall Wright rely on these factors 
in defining the internal labor market as the long-term contractual rela-
tionship between a firm and its employees with match-specific invest-
ments. s4 This link between substantial continuity and the internal 
labor market is critical to understanding labor law successorship 
doctrine. 
B. Column 1: Mergers and Stock Sales 
1. Box 1: Obligations Under the CBA After a Merger or Stock Sale 
As in the corporate context, a merger or stock sale does not, by 
itself, change any obligation under a CBA. The seminal labor law suc-
cessorship case, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, ss involved a 
statutory merger. Interscience merged into Wiley, and the much 
larger Wiley workforce absorbed the Interscience employees. When 
50. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 43 (1987). 
51. A threshold question is whether the changes resulting from the capital market transac-
tion have affected the "appropriateness" of the bargaining unit. In making its bargaining-unit 
determination, the NLRB looks to a "community of interest" among the workers. The factors in 
defining a community of interest include, for example, the similarity in the method of determin-
ing compensation; the similarity in benefits, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment; 
and common supervision and determination oflabor-relations policy. ARCHIBALD Cox, DEREK 
BOK, & ROBERT GUSMAN, LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 283 (10th ed. 1986). 
52. For a discussion of continuity of operations, see infra text accompanying note 130. 
53. PETER B. DOERINGER & MICHAEL J. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MAN· 
POWER ANALYSIS 1-2 (1971) (citing John T. Dunlop, Job Vacancy Measures and Economic 
Analysis, in NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE MEASUREMENT AND INTERPRETA-
TION OF JOB VACANCIES: A CONFERENCE REPORT 27 (1966)). 
54. Michael L. Wachter & Randall D. Wright, The Economics of Internal Labor Markets, 29 
INDUSTRIAL REL. 240 (1990). 
55. 376 U.S. 543 (1964). 
218 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:203 
Wiley refused to recognize the union as the bargaining agent of Inter-
science's employees, the union brought an action under section 301 of 
the LMRA to compel arbitration under the arbitration provision of 
the collective bargaining agreement. 56 The union sought to require 
Wiley to recognize rights of former Interscience employees which had 
vested under the now-lapsed Interscience CBA - specifically, rights 
to seniority, vacation pay, pension payments, and severance pay.57 
Wiley argued that "it never was a party to the collective bargaining 
agreement, and that, in any event, the Union lost its status as represen-
tative of the former Interscience employees when they were mingled in 
a larger Wiley unit of employees."58 
The Supreme Court held that the Interscience arbitration clause 
bound Wiley to arbitrate the employees' claims under the Interscience 
CBA, reasoning that, under state corporate law, the surviving corpo-
ration in a merger is generally liable for the obligations of the disap-
pearing firm.59 The Court, however, refused to decide whether the 
union lost its status as representative of the former Interscience 
employees. 60 
In the subsequent arbitration, the arbitrator determined that, while 
the Interscience CBA initially continued in full force after the merger, 
it was displaced once the intermingling rendered the CBA 
inapplicable. 61 
The logic of the Wiley rule thus follows the corporate law rule: the 
surviving firm or the stock purchaser has no greater or lesser obliga-
tion to abide by the CBA than the old firm. In either situation, a 
change of circumstances, sometimes initiated by the employer, may 
render the CBA inapplicable. Whether there is substantial continuity 
in the operations of the surviving firm provides evidence on the ques-
tion whether the changes in the operations are so significant as to 
render the CBA inapplicable. 62 
56. 376 U.S. at 544-45. 
57. 376 U.S. at 552. 
58. 376 U.S. at 547. 
59. 376 U.S. at 550 n.3. In addition, the Court supported its holding by referring to the 
federal policy favoring arbitration and the extent to which requiring arbitration will ease the 
transition for employees, thereby promoting labor peace. For a discussion of the procedural 
aspects of Wiley, see Alan Schwartz, Note, Procedural Arbitrability Under Section 301 of the 
LMRA, 73 YALE L.J. 1459 (1964). 
60. 376 U.S. at 547-48. 
61. Interscience Encyclopedia, Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 210, 218 (1970) (Roberts, 
Arb.). 
62. See, e.g., 55 Lab. Arb. Rep. at 218. The Fourth Circuit has commented: 
Although we find the collective bargaining agreement was binding [in the case at hand], 
we do not adopt a rule that labor agreements remain in force in every situation where corpo· 
rate ownership changes through a stock sale .... Wh.ere the corporate form survives only in 
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Wiley was still obligated for all payments due its employees under 
the CBA, including vacation pay accrued between the date of the 
merger and the apparently permissible displacement of the CBA, as 
well as job security, grievance, and seniority provisions during the 
same period. The arbitrator also held that Wiley was obligated to con-
tribute to the welfare and pension funds under the Interscience CBA, 
but that the Interscience union had settled those claims. 
Although the central issue in the case was one of contract enforce-
ment, it bears important similarities to the statutory issue of the duty 
to bargain. The CBA continues in effect as long as sufficient con-
tinuity exists to make the CBA applicable. A bargaining unit will re-
main intact after an asset or stock sale as long as substantial continuity 
exists between the old firm's and the surviving firm's workers. Subse-
quent cases have largely conformed to this rule. 63 
name, but an entirely new operation replaces the old, the corporation might not be fairly 
termed a "continuing" employer in any practical sense. 
EPE, Inc. v. NLRB, 845 F.2d 483, 490 (4th Cir. 1988). As previously discussed, we interpret 
this primarily to be a statement about the nature of the employer's obligation under a CBA, not a 
statement about whether a merger or sale of stock changes those obligations. Both before and 
after a merger or stock sale, when "an entirely new operation replaces the old" the old CBA is 
inapplicable. 
63. In NLRB v. Rockwood Energy & Mineral Corp., 942 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1991), Harmony 
Mining Co. signed a CBA effective through September, 1984. In 1982, Harmony suspended 
production because of financial difficulties. REM CO, Harmony's major creditor, acquired con-
trol by acquiring all of the Harmony stock and then sought to repudiate all obligations under the 
CBA. Ultimately, REMCO reopened production but unilaterally changed terms. The Third 
Circuit held that, because REMCO acquired control through a stock sale, it stood in Harmony's 
shoes and thus could not unilaterally change terms of the CBA. Similarly, in Esmark, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 887 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1989), the Seventh Circuit found that the CBA agreement contin-
ued to apply following transfer of a firm's ownership through a sale of its stock. See also EPE, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 845 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that CBA remains in force after stock sale); 
General Teamsters Local Union No. 249 v. Bill's Trucking, Inc., 493 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1974) 
(enforcing CBA when only the identity of stockholders and corporate name change); Phillip 
Wall & Sons, Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. 1161 (1988); Lauer's Furniture Stores, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 360 
(1979); TKB Intl. Corp., 240 N.L.R.B. 1082 (1979) (holding that, when TKB acquired 
Hendricks-Miller by a stock transfer, TKB remained a member of the multiemployer bargaining 
unit, with all the associated obligations, until withdrawal pursuant to the withdrawal require-
ments); Topinka's Country House, Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 72 (1978); Western Boot & Shoe, Inc., 205 
N.L.R.B. 999 (1973). But see NLRB v. Edjo, Inc., 631 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding 
that existing collective bargaining agreement does not bind a stock purchaser, although stock 
purchaser also may not unilaterally set initial terms). Apparently neither party in Edjo argued 
that the stock purchaser was obligated to abide by the seller's CBA. 631 F.2d at 606 n.3. One of 
the judges, however, concurred in the result on this ground. 631 F.2d at 608-09 (Blumenfeld, J., 
concurring). 
In MPE, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 519 (1976), the Board held that a stock purchaser, unaware that 
the old management had negotiated and initialed - but not yet formally executed - a new 
CBA, was not bound by it. However, the Board did not determine whether the old employer, 
having initialed the agreement, would have been obligated to execute it but for the sale. The 
Board itself seems to recognize the extent to which MPE departs from the general approach to 
Box 1 cases. In a subsequent case, the Board sought to distinguish MPE as "a situation where 
the stock transfer occurs at a time when no contract exists to be assumed," without acknowledg-
ing that the parties had negotiated and initialed a CBA prior to the transfer of the stock. 240 
N.L.R.B. at 1085. 
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In contrast to Box 1 cases, which typically arise during the term of 
a CBA, most Box 2 cases arise when control of the firm changes after 
the CBA has lapsed or prior to the signing of an initial contract. Be-
cause there is no continuing CBA, no section 301 issues arise. Instead, 
Box 2 cases hinge upon whether the surviving firm has a statutory 
duty to bargain with its workforce. Again showing the parallels be-
tween corporate and labor law, the rules of Box 2 largely follow those 
of Box 1. Labor law assumes that the firm resulting from a merger or 
a stock sale retains its identity and thus has the same duty to bargain 
as the old firm. 64 
This duty to bargain, however, continues only as long as the union 
continues to represent the employees in the bargaining unit. In Box 2-
type cases, the duty to bargain in good faith is a presumptive rather 
than absolute obligation. In the year following Board certification and 
during the term of a CBA, the union enjoys an irrebuttable presump-
tion of continuing majority support;65 subsequently that presumption 
becomes rebuttable. 66 An employer may withdraw recognition and 
stop bargaining if it can establish either that the union no longer en-
joys the support of a majority of the bargaining unit employees or that 
its refusal to bargain is based on a good faith, reasonable doubt of 
continued majority support, based on objective considerations. 67 A 
merger or stock sale does not disturb these presumptions. 68 The bur-
den remains with the firm to rebut the presumption of continued ma-
jority status. 
Thus, in United Food & Commercial Workers International Union 
v. NLRB 69 (Spencer Foods}, Land O'Lakes acquired Spencer Foods by 
acquiring all of its stock after the CBA had lapsed, the plants had been 
shut down, and the workers had been laid off. The D.C. Circuit found 
no substantial evidence in the record to support the Board's conclu-
64. See United Food & Commercial Workers Intl. Union v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 1463, 1470-71 
(D.C. Cir. 1985). 
65. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 37-39 (1987); NLRB v. 
Burns Intl. Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 279 n.3 {1972); Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954); 
Rockwood Energy, 942 F.2d at 173; see also 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 1, at 
572. 
66. Rockwood Energy, 942 F.2d at 173. 
67. Fall River, 482 U.S. at 41 n.8; NLRB v. Phoenix Pipe & Tube, L.P., 955 F.2d 852, 857 
(3d Cir. 1991); see also 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 1, at 571 (citing cases). 
68. NLRB v. Edjo, Inc., 631 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that a change of stock 
ownership does not alter the presumptions regarding continued majority support and duty to 
bargain). 
69. 768 F.2d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
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sion that the new Spencer Foods - that is, the firm now owned by 
Land O'Lakes - justifiably refused to bargain with the union, and the 
court remanded the case to the Board to fashion a remedy. 
Spencer Foods illustrates the role that substantial continuity plays 
in Box 2 cases - that is, cases involving a successor firm's duty to 
bargain after a merger or stock sale. Substantial continuity is irrele-
vant to whether the old firm's duty to bargain carries forward to the 
new firm or owners. Substantial continuity, however, is critical to de-
termining whether the new firm can rebut the presumption of contin-
ued majority support that exists even after a CBA has expired. Lack 
of substantial continuity can establish either lack of majority support 
or a good faith and reasonable belief based on objective considerations 
that the union no longer enjoys majority support in the relevant 
bargaining unit. In Spencer Foods, the Court held that, given the sub-
stantial continuity that existed between the old and new firms, the new 
firm had not rebutted the presumption that the union enjoyed majority 
support in the workforce, and therefore the firm was obligated to bar-
gain collectively. The court's holding rested on the administrative law 
judge's finding that the layoffs probably would be temporary, serving 
to "effectuate a sale of an ongoing business enterprise to [Land 
O'Lakes], i.e., a business which encompassed the resumed operations 
of the Spencer plant by [Spencer Foods] albeit under new 
ownership. "70 
C. Column 2: Sale of Assets 
Boxes 3 and 4 concern transactions between the old firm and the 
surviving firm that involve a sale of assets. Recall that, under the cor-
porate law rule, a purchaser of assets does not assume the claims of 
known claimants in tort or contract unless specifically agreed. On the 
other hand, with respect to long-tail tort claimants, corporate law has 
developed legal mechanisms to limit opportunistic behavior. The la-
bor law cases follow the same pattern with a different spin. 
70. 768 F.2d at 1472 (quoting Spencer Foods, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1483, 1509 (1984)). But 
for a contrasting case, see NLRB v. Rockwood Energy & Mineral Corp., 942 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 
1991). In Rockwood Energy, the court correctly held that substantial continuity was irrelevant to 
whether the duty to bargain remained after a stock sale. However, the court virtually ignored 
the importance of substantial continuity to the determination whether the employer had carried 
its burden of establishing that the union no longer enjoyed majority support after a five-year 
hiatus. See, e.g., Miami Foundry Corp. v. NLRB, 682 F.2d 587 (6th Cir. 1982); Miller Trucking 
Serv., Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 556 (1969), enforcement denied on other grounds, 445 F.2d 927 (10th 
Cir. 1971). 
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1. Box 3: Obligations Under the CBA After an Asset Sale 
Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Board 11 in-
volved the obligations of the purchaser of assets under the seller's col-
lective bargaining agreement. Originally, the Grissoms operated a 
Howard Johnson franchise motel and adjacent restaurant. The em-
ployees, represented by a union, had entered into a CBA with the 
Grissoms containing an arbitration provision. Howard Johnson subse-
quently leased the premises, hiring only a few of the Grissom employ-
ees. The union brought an action against Howard Johnson under 
section 301 of the LMRA to enforce rights of employees not hired by 
Howard Johnson. The Grissoms had agreed to arbitrate the extent of 
their liability to the former employees under the CBA. 72 
The Court held that Howard Johnson was not obligated under the 
CBA between the former employees and the Grissoms. 73 The Court 
distinguished Wiley, on which the union principally relied, on the 
grounds that Wiley had involved a merger; in contrast, Howard John-
son involved a sale of assets, after which the Grissoms - the initial 
employers - remained a viable corporate entity against whom the 
union could enforce any obligations under the CBA. 74 Indeed, even 
though the CBA with the Grissoms contained a "successors and as-
signs clause" - purporting to make the agreement binding on any 
successors and assigns - the Court held that the clause could not bind 
a nonconsenting party but perhaps could have permitted the union to 
enjoin the lease to Howard Johnson as a breach of the clause. 75 
The rule of Howard Johnson, like the analogous corporate law rule, 
is thus that, when a firm acquires assets, it does not assume the seller's 
contractual obligations, specifically its collective bargaining agree-
ment, unless it agrees to adopt it. 76 The Court noted that this rule was 
consistent with federal labor law, which imposes no "official compul-
sion" to sign a contract or to adopt any specific contractual terms. 77 
As the primary justification for this rule, the Court invoked a corpo-
rate law goal of free capital mobility: "holding a new employer bound 
by the substantive terms of the pre-existing collective-bargaining 
agreement might inhibit the free transfer of capital."78 As a logical 
71. 417 U.S. 249 (1974). 
72. 417 U.S. at 255. 
73. 417 U.S. at 264-65. 
74. 417 U.S. at 257. 
75. 417 U.S. at 258 n.3. 
76. See also Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987). 
77. Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 254. 
78. 417 U.S. at 255 (explaining NLRB v. Burns Intl. Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 287-88 
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extension of this reasoning, the Court also reached the central holding 
that Howard Johnson had no duty to hire the predecessor's 
employees. 79 
2. Box 4: Obligations Under the NLRA After an Asset Sale 
Just as Box 4 of the corporate law matrix proves to be the most 
complicated and difficult because of the potential for strategic behav-
ior, so too does Box 4 of the labor law matrix. The principal Box 4 
issue is whether an asset purchaser has a duty to bargain with the 
union that represented the employees of the seller. so 
In Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 81 the Supreme 
Court held that, when substantial continuity exists between the busi-
ness of the asset seller and purchaser, the asset purchaser has a duty to 
bargain with the seller's union if "the majority of its employees were 
employed by its predecessor."82 Because the successor has no duty to 
hire the predecessor's employees, however, the Court concluded that 
triggering the duty to bargain "rests in the hands of the successor."83 
The courts have made it clear that an asset purchaser cannot avoid 
a duty to bargain by discriminating against employees of the seller 
because of their union status. 84 What counts as anti union animus in 
the failure to hire employees of the asset seller has been litigated exten-
sively. 85 Critical factors that suggest antiunion animus include: 
(1972)). Beyond this, the Court offers no argument for why it should not deem an asset pur-
chaser to have consented to the successor and assigns clause. By contrast, our analysis provides 
an explanation. 
79. 417 U.S. at 264. 
80. A secondary issue is whether an asset purchaser is liable for the asset seller's unfair labor 
practices. The Supreme Court held in Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973), 
that a purchaser who bought with knowledge of the seller's unfair labor practices is jointly and 
severally liable. This holding departs from the background corporate law rule, under which the 
asset purchaser is normally not liable for the obligations of the seller. The courts subsequently 
have held that the asset purchaser is liable when it had notice of unfair labor practice charges by 
the union, even though formal charges had not been filed. NLRB v. General Wood Preserving 
Co., 905 F.2d 803 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1016 (1990). 
81. 482 U.S. 27 (1987). 
82. 482 U.S. at 41. Fall River did not resolve the ambiguity in prior cases with respect to 
whether the duty to bargain attaches if the asset purchaser hires a majority of the seller's repre-
sented employees but those employees do not constitute a majority of the employees of the pur-
chaser. 482 U.S. at 46 n.12. The Board, supported by the courts of appeal, has held that 
workforce continuity only exists if a majority of the asset purchaser's employees were employed 
by the seller. Saks & Co. v. NLRB, 634 F.2d 681, 684-86 & nn.2-3 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing relevant 
cases); Spruce Up Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 194, 196 (1974), enforced, 529 F.2d 516 (4th Cir. 1975); 
United Maintenance & Mfg. Co., 214 N.L.R.B. 529, 532-34 (1974). 
83. Fall River, 482 U.S. at 41. 
84. 482 U.S. at 39-40; Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 
249, 262 n.8 (1974); Elastic Stop Nut v. NLRB, 921 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
85. See generally the cases cited in 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 1, at 797 
nn.168 & 170. United Food & Commercial Workers Intl. Union v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 1463, 1470-
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efforts by the new employer to discover from the old employer the 
union sympathies of its employees, followed by a refusal to hire those 
identified as sympathetic; hiring criteria with a disparate impact; and 
an overall scheme designed to ensure that fewer than a majority of the 
employees are union members. Factors inconsistent with animus in-
clude unsuitability for new employer's operations and uniformly ap-
plied, valid business reasons for hiring a totally inexperienced 
workforce. In aggregate, these factors suggest that, if a new employer 
maintains the old operations intact, hiring new, inexperienced, nonun-
ion employees in preference to experienced, union employees indicates 
antiunion animus. 86 By contrast, if operations substantially are 
changed so that experience in the old operation would be of little value 
in the new operation, no such inference is warranted. 
In these cases, the critical issue is whether the union or the firm 
has the burden of establishing majority support or its absence. In an 
asset sale, when substantial continuity of operations and workforce ex-
ists, the firm must establish lack of support if it does not wish to bar-
gain collectively. This obligation is precisely the same duty as the old 
firm has after a CBA has lapsed. 87 When, on the other hand, there is 
no substantial continuity in the workforce, the union has its normal 
burden of establishing majority support before the firm has a duty to 
bargain collectively. 88 
Although many labor law scholars argue that successorship rules 
provide scant protection to unions, Box 4 of our labor law taxonomy 
shows that employees receive substantially greater protection than cor-
porate law gives creditors generally. The fundamental goal of corpo-
rate law successorship doctrine, as noted above, 89 is to place creditors 
in the same position vis-a-vis the successor as they were vis-a-vis the 
predecessor with respect to their contractual entitlements. If creditors 
71 (D.C. Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Spencer Foods] provides one case in point. In Spencer Foods, the 
court found an asset purchaser to have discriminated against the union when it adopted a hiring 
standard which disqualified many former union members from consideration for reemployment 
but did not apply the standard uniformly in comparable situations. 768 F.2d at 1474-76. By 
way of contrast, in Inland Container Corp., 267 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1983), modified by 273 N.L.R.B. 
1856 (1985); 274 N.L.R.B. 887 (1985); 275 N.L.R.B. 378 (1985), Inland claimed that it refused 
to hire the predecessor's workers because, having not been trained in the "Inland Way," they had 
formed "bad habits." When the record showed that Inland applied this rule in comparable situa-
tions, the Board found no antiunion animus. 267 N.L.R.B. at 1190. Subsequent evidence that 
Inland only hired applicants willing to work in a nonunion environment, however, led the Board 
to reverse this finding. See 275 N.L.R.B. at 382-88. 
86. See, e.g .. United States Marine Corp. v. NLRB, 944 F.2d 1305, 1315-17 (7th Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1474 (1992); Spencer Foods, 768 F.2d at 1474-76. 
87. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text. 
88. See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 1, at 562-63. 
89. See supra text accompanying notes 12-16. 
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are no worse off after a sale of assets than they were before, they have 
no grounds for complaint. Thus, if a financially weak firm sells all or 
substantially all its assets for fair value, creditors are no worse off and 
known creditors have no claim against the asset purchaser. 
Labor law provides the corporate law protection of employees as 
creditors so routinely that courts and commentators have largely ig-
nored it. If the asset seller owes the employees wages, the employees 
can recover those wages from the seller. But, in striking contrast to 
the corporate law successorship doctrine with its focus on controlling 
behavior of the predecessor, labor law successorship doctrine also fo-
cuses on the behavior of the asset purchaser. Over and above the cred-
itor protections afforded by corporate law successorship doctrine and 
other creditor protective measures - for example, fraudulent convey-
ance and bulk transfer restrictions - labor law provides that, when an 
asset purchaser maintains substantial continuity with the asset seller 
by hiring a majority of the seller's employees, the asset purchaser has a 
duty to bargain collectively. We will argue that the employees' dis-
tinctive relationship with the firm best explains this difference. 90 
3. Constructive Adoption of the CBA and Setting Initial Terms 
After an Asset Purchase 
In distinguishing Howard Johnson from Wiley, the Court relied on 
the form of the transaction, that is, on the fact that Howard Johnson 
involved an asset sale rather than a merger.91 The Court's reliance on 
this corporate law distinction supports our claim that the corporate 
taxonomy provides a useful basis for a positive theory of labor law 
successorship doctrine. Under this taxonomy, structuring a transac-
tion as an asset sale rather than a merger results in different obliga-
tions in both corporate and labor law. To that extent, locating the 
boundary between Box 3 and Box 1 with respect to CBA claims, and 
between Box 4 and Box 2 with respect to the duty to bargain, becomes 
critical.92 
The boundary question most clearly arises when the asset pur-
chaser hires all the seller's workers to do the same work as they were 
doing before. Had a merger occurred, Wiley makes it clear that the 
old CBA would fully bind the new firm. 93 In such circumstances, the 
new firm must continue the terms of the old CBA and, subsequently, 
will be obligated to bargain over wages, hours, or terms and conditions 
90. See infra Part IV. 
91. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 256 (1974). 
92. For the analogous issue in corporate law, see supra text accompanying notes 18-35. 
93. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 551 (1964). 
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of employment to impasse before making unilateral changes. When a 
sale of assets occurs, by contrast, Howard Johnson makes it clear that 
the asset purchaser is not bound by the seller's CBA unless it agrees to 
adopt it.94 Similarly, Fall River makes clear that, when substantial 
continuity of workforce and operations exists, the asset purchaser will 
assume a duty to bargain.95 
In this boundary case, however, when the asset purchaser hires all 
the old employees to do the same work as they were doing before, does 
the CBA carry forward to the lesser degree that the asset purchaser 
must continue its terms while bargaining over any changes from the 
old CBA, a process that can drag out for a long time? Although this 
situation provides the same general temptation to argue that "form" 
should not be elevated over "substance, " 96 the doctrine has pursued a 
different path. In dictum in the Burns case, the Court suggested that 
in some circumstances the old CBA would carry forward in setting the 
initial terms: 
Although a successor employer is ordinarily free to set initial terms on 
which it will hire the employees of a predecessor, there will be instances 
in which it is perfectly clear that the new employer plans to retain all of 
the employees in the unit and in which it will be appropriate to have him 
initially consult with the employees' bargaining representative before he 
fixes terms. 97 
The Court thus left open room for a limited exception to the general 
rule that the predecessor's CBA does not bind the successor. 
In the Spruce Up doctrine,98 the Board has elaborated on the 
94. 417 U.S. 249, 262, 264-65. 
95. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 46 (1987). 
96. See, e.g., United States Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers, 384 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1967), 
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1042 (1968). In that case, U.S. Gypsum purchased all property and assets 
of a United Cement plant and continued the operations unchanged. Initially, the Fifth Circuit 
held that Gypsum was bound by the arbitration provision of United Cement's CBA, despite the 
fact that it merely acquired the assets and that the purchase agreement undertook to exclude the 
CBA from the purchase. 384 F.2d at 41-44. The Fifth Circuit revisited the question in a second, 
post-Bums opinion. There, the Fifth Circuit held that, despite Bums, the arbitrator was not 
barred from ordering that Gypsum comply with the terms of the United Cement contract. The 
court relied heavily on the Sixth Circuit's opinion in the Howard Johnson case, which imposed 
the terms of the old employer CBA in a case in which the new employer had not retained the old 
employees. United Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974). Finally, in its third Gypsum opinion, the Fifth Circuit held that the 
Supreme Court's reversal of Howard Johnson did not change its own conclusion because, unlike 
Howard Johnson, Gypsum involved substantial continuity of the workforce. United Steelworkers 
v. United States Gypsum Co., 498 F.2d 334 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974). The 
Fifth Circuit's holding is clearly no longer good law; Fall River made it clear that an asset pur-
chaser who explicitly rejects the old CBA up front is not bound by it, no matter how much 
continuity exists in the workforce. 
97. NLRB v. Burns.Intl. Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 294-95 (1972). 
98. The doctrine is named after the leading Board decision, Spruce Up Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 
194 (1974), enforced, 529 F.2d 516 (4th Cir. 1975). See generally 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR 
LAW, supra note 1, at 814-16. In Spruce Up, the new employer displaced the old employer in the 
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Supreme Court's caveat, defining the circumstance under which an as-
set purchaser must bargain over initial terms. The scope of the Spruce 
Up doctrine is important in analyzing the success of our taxonomy. A 
broad scope for the doctrine would result in treating many asset sales 
similarly to stock sales. 
Consistent with the corporate law approach to the obligations of 
asset purchasers, however, the doctrine restricts the Burns caveat to 
those situations in which an agreement to continue the CBA can be 
implied. In particular, the caveat applies to (1) "circumstances in 
which the new employer has either actively or, by tacit inference, mis-
led employees into believing they would all be retained without change 
in their wages, hours, or conditions of employment"; or (2) "to cir-
cumstances where the new employer ... has failed to clearly announce 
its intent to establish a new set of conditions prior to inviting former 
employees to accept employment."99 The courts of appeals have 
largely followed the Board's Spruce Up interpretation.100 
Spruce Up barber shop concession at Fort Bragg. Prior to taking over the concession, the new 
employer, Fowler, refused to recognize or bargain with the old union but told the union repre-
sentatives that "all the barbers who are working will work." He also informed them of the 
commission rates he intended to pay, which were significantly below what the barbers had been 
earning from the previous concessionaire. The union alleged that Fowler had committed unfair 
labor practices by refusing to bargain and by unilaterally changing the commission rates. Ulti-
mately, more than half of the barbers in the new Spruce Up shops had worked for the old conces-
sionaire. 209 N.L.R.B. at 194-95. The case thus presented the question of the scope of the 
Burns caveat: Is the new employer who expresses a willingness or an intention to hire the old 
employees free to set initial terms, or must it abide by the old CBA until it negotiates a new 
agreement or bargains to impasse? 
99. 209 N.L.R.B. at 195. As examples of cases that fall within the Burns caveat, the Board 
cited two prior opinions "where the successor-employers, without prior warning, unilaterally 
changed the terms and conditions of employment prevailing under the predecessor after already 
having committed themselves to hire almost all of the old unit employees with no notice that 
they would be expected to work under new and different terms." 209 N.L.R.B. at 195 n.7 (citing 
Howard Johnson Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 763 (1972), a.ffd., 496 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1974); Good Foods 
Mfg. & Processing Corp., 200 N.L.R.B. 623 (1972), a.ffd., 492 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1974)). 
100. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Ry. v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
423 U.S. 1017 (1975). The court stated: 
We read [the Burns caveat] as being limited to those situations where employees are led at 
the outset by the successor-employer to believe that they will have continuity of employment 
on pre-existing terms and as not applying where the new employer dispels any such impres-
sion prior to or simultaneously with its offer to employ the predecessor's work force. 
523 F.2d at 171; see also United States Marine Corp. v. NLRB, 944 F.2d 1305, 1321-22 (7th Cir. 
1991) (holding that new employer cannot create ambiguity about its plan to hire old employees 
through illegal activity), cerL denied, 112 S. Ct. 1474 (1992); Saks & Co. v. NLRB, 634 F.2d 681, 
687 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that new employer did not lead employees to believe preexisting terms 
would continue and was free to change terms); Bellingham Frozen Foods v. NLRB, 626 F.2d 
674, 680 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that new employer who maintained previous working condi-
tions for a week after takeover could not unilaterally change terms), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1125 
(1981); Nazareth Regional High Sch. v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 873, 881 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that 
new employer may fix initial terms when it does not explicitly state an intention to hire old 
employees on preexisting terms); Spitzer Akron, Inc. v. NLRB, 540 F.2d 841, 845 (6th Cir. 1976) 
(holding that new employer who hires all the old employees and tells them that the company 
would "carry on as usual'' cannot subsequently institute unilateral changes), cert. denied, 429 
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The Burns caveat, as developed in the Board's Spruce Up doctrine, 
thus imposes an obligation on a new employer to give advance notice if 
it wants both to hire the old employees and to set initial terms unilat-
erally. Otherwise, it runs the risk that the Board or a court will find 
that the new employer either impliedly adopted the old CBA or 
adopted the old CBA as the initial terms, changes from which will be 
subject to a mandatory duty to bargain. The question whether the 
new employer has manifested an intent to be bound by the old CBA 
will thus be a factual question in which substantial continuity in oper-
ations and workforce are relevant but not dispositive 
considerations. 101 
D. Column 3: Shift of Work 
Labor law's focus on the behavior of the continuing firm yields a 
third column that emanates from NLRB v. Burns International Secur-
ity Services, Inc. 102 In Burns, the old employer, Wackenhut, and the 
new employer, Bums, had no contractual relationship. Bums did not 
merge with or purchase any assets from Wackenhut. Rather, Bums 
displaced Wackenhut in a security contract with Lockheed by making 
a lower bid. Subsequently, Bums hired many of Wackenhut's former 
employees. The union that represented the Wackenhut employees al-
leged that Bums both was bound by the Wackenhut CBA and obli-
gated to bargain collectively under the NLRA. The case thus squarely 
raised the questions of the new employer's obligations in Box 5 (under 
the old employer's CBA) and Box 6 (under the NLRA). 
1. Box 5: Obligations Under the CBA After a Shift of Work 
The Supreme Court held that Bums did not have a duty to observe 
the substantive terms of the Wackenhut CBA, to which Bums had 
never agreed. 103 Box 5 is thus essentially the same as Box 3, which 
concerns CBAs following a sale of assets: the CBA carries forward 
only if the new firm adopts it. 104 The Court distinguished the Wiley 
U.S. 1040 (1977); Zim's Foodline v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1131, 1142-44 (7th Cir.) (finding that new 
employer who continues old terms for three weeks cannot make changes unilaterally), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974). 
101. See, e.g., United States Can Co., 305 N.L.R.B. 1127 (1992) (holding that new employer 
adopted its predecessor's CBA), enforced, 984 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1993). 
102. 406 U.S. 272 (1972). 
103. 406 U.S. at 291. 
104. See also Auto Mechanics Local Lodge No. 1101 v. NLRB, 945 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(opinion at No. 90-70096, 1991 WL 197005 (Oct. 3, 1991)) (holding that union obligated to 
bargain with successor employer); Boeing Co. v. International Assn. of Machinists & Aerospace 
Workers, 504 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that lack of continuity of work force absolves 
new employer from duty to arbitrate under old employer's CBA), cert. denied, 421 U.S 913 
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case (Box 1) on the same corporate law grounds as it used in Howard 
Johnson, namely, that Wiley involved a merger occurring against a 
background of state law that provided that the surviving firm would be 
liable for the disappearing firm's obligations.105 
2. Box 6: The Duty To Bargain After a Shift of Work 
With regard to the duty to bargain, the Burns Court went on to 
hold that, because the union had been designated the exclusive bar-
gaining agent in an election a few months before and the new em-
ployer had hired a majority of the old employer's employees, the duty 
to bargain carried forward. 106 Thus, Box 6 parallels Box 4, which 
concerns the duty to bargain after a sale of assets: in each case, sub-
stantial continuity creates a rebuttable presumption of continued ma-
jority support. 107 Whether the new firm must bargain over initial 
terms is, as in Box 3, governed by the Spruce Up doctrine. 108 Box 6 is 
a category completely absent from the corporate successorship doc-
trine and, like Box 4, gives substantial extra protection to employees 
over that afforded creditors generally. 109 
E. The Failure of the Supreme Court To Adopt the Taxonomy 
Neither courts nor legal commentators have previously recognized 
that the corporate law taxonomy carries over more or less intact to 
labor law. Indeed, it is worth noting that cases are still litigated over 
(1975). But see Systems Management, Inc. v. NLRB, 901 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1990). Systems 
Management held that, when antiunion animus led to lack of workforce continuity and refusal to 
bargain, the injured employees were entitled to back pay at the old rate, although perhaps only 
until impasse would have been reached. It is unclear, however, whether the court asserted that 
the old CBA should have set initial terms or whether the court believed that, had the old union 
been bargaining, the employer would have been willing to pay the old rate. 
105. Burns (Box 5) does not make clear whether substantial continuity in the workforce 
creates a rebuttable presumption that the old CBA carries forward absent explicit repudiation. 
Bums told the ex-Wackenhut employees when hired that Bums" 'could not live with' the ex-
isting contract between Wackenhut and the union." 406 U.S. at 275. The Court never addressed 
the question whether an explicit repudiation was necessary or whether this constituted an explicit 
repudiation. 
106. 406 U.S. at 278. 
107. See, e.g., NLRB v. New Medico Health Care Ctr., 951 F.2d 350 (6th Cir. 1991) (opinion 
at No. 91-5271, 1991WL276260 (Dec. 20, 1991)) (finding that duty to bargain carries forward 
when the successor hires virtually all former employees), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2965 (1992); 
Auto Mechanics Local Lodge No. 1101 v. NLRB, 945 F.2d 408 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that 
duty to bargain carries forward when successor rehires 11 of 13 former employees); Systems 
Management, 901 F.2d 297 (finding that, when antiunion animus prevents the determination of 
whether a majority of new employees would have been former employees of old firm, firm has a 
duty to bargain). 
108. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text. 
109. As Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent, Burns offers labor claimants added protection 
over nonlabor claimants by divorcing labor claims against a successor from the actual assets the 
successor acquires. Burns, 406 U.S. at 305. 
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whether Column 1 (mergers and s.tock purchases) or Column 2 (sale of 
assets) rules apply, with firms attempting to have Column 2 rules ap-
plied to stock purchases, and unions attempting to have Column 1 
rules applied to asset purchases. 110 The source of the confusion partly 
derives from the evolution of the Supreme Court cases and the result-
ing failure of the Supreme Court to recognize the taxonomy and to 
adopt it explicitly. Burns represented the first recognition that the 
holding in Wiley turned on the fact that it was a Column 1 case. But 
Burns involved the atypical shift of work of Column 3 and hence could 
not clarify the differences between the more typical Column 2 and 
Column 1 cases. Golden State Bottling Co. was the first Supreme 
Court case involving the purchase of assets, but it involved the narrow 
issue of whether an asset purchaser, having purchased substantially all 
of the assets and having hired substantially all of the employees, suc-
ceeded to the duty to remedy an unfair labor practice.111 
Not until Howard Johnson did the Court deal with the critical Col-
umn 2 issue: whether an asset purchaser succeeded to the CBA. The 
Court correctly identified the importance of the difference between 
Howard Johnson's asset sale and Wiley's stock sale. In its Box 3 rul-
ing, however, the Court planted the seeds of future confusion by stat-
ing that "ordinarily there is no basis for distinguishing among 
mergers, consolidations, or purchases of assets in the analysis of suc-
cessorship problems."112 This unfortunate comment has led the 
Board and lower courts into believing, incorrectly, that the distinction 
between transactions is irrelevant. Finally, the court did not directly 
resolve the Box 4 question until Fall River Dyeing in 1987.113 Again, 
the Court correctly used, but did not adopt, the corporate law 
taxonomy. 
Our application of the corporate taxonomy to the labor context, 
and the continuing evolution of the cases, shows that, despite dicta to 
the contrary, the form of the transaction does in fact matter. 
110. See, e.g., United States Can Co. v. NLRB, 984 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1993). Oddly, 
although this was clearly a merger-stock sale case (Column 1), all the parties litigated the case as 
if it were a sale of assets case (Column 2). 
111. The Court held that it did. Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 180 
(1973). 
112. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 257 (1974). 
The Court noted that it had previously reached the same conclusion in Golden State, 414 U.S. at 
168. In Golden State the Court stated: 
The refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, 
consolidations, and purchases of assets is attributable to the fact that, so long as there is a 
continuity in the "employing industry," the public policies underlying the doctrine will be 
served by its broad application. 
414 U.S. at 182-83 n.5. 
113. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987). 
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Although the Supreme Court has consistently limited its holdings 
rather than explicitly adopting a corporate taxonomy for the labor 
context, its decisions are fully consistent with the taxonomy. More-
over, applying the taxonomy to lower court and Board decisions re-
solves much of the confusion concerning which Supreme Court 
precedent applies in a given context.114 
F. The Substantial Continuity Thread 
As we have shown, substantial continuity in operations and 
workforce play important, but fundamentally different, roles in the dif-
ferent boxes of the labor law successorship taxonomy. In Box 1, the 
question is whether the CBA carries forward after a merger or stock 
sale. In this area, substantial continuity helps determine whether cir-
cumstances have changed so substantially that the CBA can no longer 
be applied. Circumstances after a stock sale or merger may change 
sufficiently for an arbitrator to conclude that the CBA is no longer 
applicable. In Box 2, the key issue is whether the duty to bargain 
carries forward after a merger or stock sale. In Box 2 cases, substan-
tial continuity helps determine whether the firm can rebut tlie pre-
sumption of continuing majority support of the union. The changes 
sufficient in Box 1 to render the CBA inapplicable may not, in Box 2, 
be sufficient to disturb an existing duty to bargain. 
In Column 2, substantial continuity works differently. In Box 3, 
the critical question is whether the CBA carries forward to the asset 
purchaser. The background rule ·is that no obligations carry forward, 
but substantial continuity may create a rebuttable presumption that 
places a burden on the asset purchaser to establish explicit rejection of 
the old CBA. In any event, the possibility that the Board or the courts 
may find constructive adoption in cases of substantial continuity pro-
vides an incentive for asset purchasers to reject the old CBA explicitly 
if they do not wish it to bind them. By contrast, in Box 4, the question 
is whether the duty to bargain carries forward. In this area, substan-
tial continuity determines whether the firm or the union bears the bur-
den of rebutting or establishing majority support. But, as in Column 
1, the extent of continuity sufficient to trigger a duty to bargain in Box 
4 will not necessarily trigger a rebuttable presumption in Box 3. In-
deed, the Spruce Up doctrine demands a great deal before imposing 
114. For example, the frequently debated role of Wiley becomes clear. Contrary to much of 
the literature, see sources cited supra note 5, the Supreme Court has never overturned or limited 
Wiley. Wiley remains today, as when first decided, the case defining the CBA obligations of the 
stock purchaser (Box 1). See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). The 
error in believing that Wiley ever had a broader scope resulted from a failure to recognize that 
labor law cannot ignore the substantive distinctions that arise from corporate law. 
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any obligation under the old CBA on the asset purchaser. In addition, 
the scarce case law suggests that the shift of work cases, Boxes 5 and 
6, largely follow Boxes 3 and 4. The preceding reconstruction and 
comparison of corporate and labor law successorship doctrine sets up 
a puzzle. The doctrines provide strikingly similar treatments of those 
with contractual claims on the firm. But differences exist as well. 
Some of these are relatively small differences, such as the nature of the 
presumptions. Others are more substantial, such as the duty to bar-
gain imposed on the new firm in Boxes 4 and 6. 
What we find most intriguing is that the differences, large and 
small, revolve in different ways around the same core concept: sub-
stantial continuity. Moreover, as noticed above, substantial continuity 
bears a significant relationship to what economists term the "internal 
labor market."115 As we hope to show, this clue provides the key to 
understanding labor law successorship doctrine and its relationship to 
corporate law successorship doctrine. 
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL 
LABOR MARKETS 
In the preceding reconstruction of the labor law successorship doc-
trines, we showed that a formal structure based on the corporate law 
characteristics of the transactions at issue largely describes the courts' 
and Board's opinions. We believe this analysis is significant because 
the traditional labor law analyses, by ignoring the formal corporate 
law characteristics of transactions and focusing instead on the duty at 
issue, 116 have failed to provide a workable taxonomy that describes 
and predicts cases. The core of our theory of successorship is that the 
substantial continuity test, which plays such a central role in the labor 
law successorship doctrines, is largely identical to the labor econo-
mists' question whether the internal labor market of the firm has 
changed. 117 In this Part, we outline the relevant economics literature 
on internal labor markets.11s 
115. See infra text accompanying note 130. 
116. That is, the duty to arbitrate, the duty to adhere to the terms of the contract, the duty to 
bargain, and the duty to redress unfair labor practices. 
117. The scope of an asset sale can be either broader or narrower than the predecessor's 
internal labor market (ILM). When the successor's new ILM is either much broader or nar· 
rower than the predecessor's, a threshold question may be whether the new unit is an appropriate 
bargaining unit. In our discussion of successorship, we assume initially an affirmative answer to 
this threshold question - that is, that there exists a union of the predecessor's workers that is an 
appropriate bargaining unit. 
118. For a review and integration of the economic analyses of internal labor markets, see 
Wachter & Wright, supra note 54, at 86-108 (citing sources and reviews). 
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A. The Internal Labor Market and the Protection of Match-Specific 
Investments 
Labor economists distinguish between two fundamentally different 
labor markets. The external labor market (ELM) is the market in 
which firms seek to fill vacancies and workers search for new jobs. 
The textbook ELM is segmented by the general skills of the workers, 
covers broad geographical regions, and contains large numbers of 
firms and workers. Hence, both the supply and demand sides of the 
market have numerous parties. There is also a considerable amount of 
information available to the parties concerning prevailing wages and 
unemployment rates. Because firms and workers have no investments 
that are specific to the relationship, it can be terminated at low cost to 
both parties. As a result, ELMs are typically competitive markets, 
with little potential for super-competitive returns to one party coupled 
with below-competitive returns to the other. In other words, there is 
little potential for successful rent seeking. 119 
But, as long recognized, the textbook ELM fails to describe the 
employment relationship observed within firms. 120 This internal labor 
market (ILM) is very different. In the observed ILM, firms and work-
ers both make investments in their match, which are lost if the rela-
tionship is terminated. These investments encompass both 
investments in identifying and training employees and joint invest-
ments in the organization of work in a firm. Once tied together in the 
ILM, relevant information is asymmetrically distributed. Firms have 
private information about product markets and conditions and avail-
able technologies while workers have information advantages concern-
ing their own work effort and opportunity wages if a new job were 
sought. As a result, the ILM, unlike the ELM, is not a competitive 
market but, rather, is better modeled as a bilateral monopoly with con-
siderable potential for rent seeking. 
Why might firms and workers voluntarily eschew the competitive 
ELM, with its protections, for the bilateral monopoly of the ILM? 
The ILM literature addresses this puzzle from two directions. First, 
ILMs generate surpluses over the returns available in the ELM, sur-
pluses sufficiently large that they leave both parties better off even after 
the costs imposed by rent-seeking behavior. Second, the structures 
119. We define rent seeking as the expenditure of resources or efforts by one party in order to 
transfer resources from the other party to itself. This investment by the rent seekers is economi-
cally wasteful relative to the joint profits of the parties, because it creates no new wealth. More-
over, rent seeking by one party typically causes the prospective rent payer to expend resources in 
order to protect its share of the joint investment. Because ELMs involve no joint investments, 
they provide no opportunity for rent seeking. 
120. See Wachter & Wright, supra note 54, at 241 & nn.2-3. 
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adopted in internal labor markets constrain such rent-seeking 
behavior. 
ILM theorists have identified four central economic factors that 
affect an ongoing employment relationship and that are necessary to 
explain the observed patterns within ILMs: (1) firm- or match-spe-
cific training; (2) risk aversion; (3) asymmetric information; and (4) 
transaction costs. 121 Relying on a combination of these factors, ILM 
theorists have been able to analyze otherwise puzzling but widespread 
features of the employment relationship as incentive-compatible con-
tracts designed to solve the twin problems endemic to ILMs: namely, 
to encourage the optimal match-specific investments while deterring 
the parties from using their asymmetric information in a rent-seeking 
manner. 122 
From this perspective, for example, one can understand why both 
the firm and the worker typically invest in the match: it encourages 
the maintenance of the relationship. If only one party made such a 
commitment, the noninvesting party could "hold up" the other party, 
threatening to terminate the relationship unless a higher return were 
paid. Such a threat would be credible because the investing party, but 
not the threatening party, would lose the return on its match-specific 
investment. By contrast, joint investments deter such behavior: be-
cause the threatening party would absorb a loss in carrying out its 
threat to terminate the relationship, the opportunity to use such a 
threat in a rent-seeking manner is reduced. 123 
The ILM contract is ongoing and forward-looking. Investment is 
continuous, and the parties will continue to deal with each other as 
long as match-specific returns continue to be available and as long as 
continuing match-specific investments receive adequate protection. 
The governance structure for those ongoing relationships may be rela-
tively explicit, as in the union sector, or implicit, as in the nonunion 
sector. In either case, unless rules can be devised to deal with new 
contingencies, the parties will lose the joint surpluses created by effi-
cient ILMs. 
121. See id. at 90-99. 
122. Incentive-compatible contract terms are terms that make it in the interest of both par-
ties to maximize the joint surplus available to them. 
123. Other examples of incentive-compatible terms are seniority clauses, wage profiles that 
increase with experience, reductions in employment rather than wages during declines in eco-
nomic activity, and unilateral implementation by firms of decisions affecting levels of output nnd 
product prices. For a discussion of these features, see Wachter & Wright, supra note 54, nt 94-
99. 
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B. The ILM Analysis of Temporary Layoffs, Discharge for Cause, 
and Permanent Reductions in Force 
The economic issues raised by successorship are similar to the is-
sues raised by other management actions that have a substantial im-
pact on the employment relationship. In this section we take the first 
steps toward evaluating whether the successorship rules of labor law 
are incentive-compatible by considering the ILM theorists' analysis of 
the termination of the employment relationship in other situations: 
discharge for cause, temporary layoffs, and permanent reductions in 
force. In each of these cases, the observed practices appear to prefer 
permanent reductions in employment over less severe adjustments. 
While this may initially seem to conflict with the presumed interest of 
the parties in maintaining the employment relationship, the threat of 
employment reduction is indeed incentive-compatible for joint-profit 
maximization, while less severe adjustments would not be. 
For example, firms rarely make minor reductions in wages to disci-
pline workers who shirk. Instead, they typically discharge the work-
ers, thereby terminating the relationship. The explanation for this 
behavior rests on the fact that workers know their work effort, but 
firms do not. Firms can learn by monitoring, but constant monitoring 
is very costly. To save on costs, firms monitor workers infrequently. 
The low detection rate drives the harsh penalty for shirking. If most 
shirking goes undetected because of the high monitoring costs, firms 
must penalize workers an amount greater than the expected loss of any 
specific incident. The penalty must be set so that the expected cost to 
the workers of shirking equals the loss to the firm. When detection 
rates are low, the penalty is very high to raise the expected value to 
required levels. Conversely, to encourage workers to consummate 
work effort, the firm must offer rewards when it learns of superior 
effort.124 
But the penalty for shirking cannot be a wage reduction. If the 
firm could simply declare that a group of workers were underperform-
ing and cut their wages, firms would have an incentive to overstate the 
degree of shirking, thereby reducing costs and increasing profits. 
Forcing firms to discharge workers eliminates the firm's incentive to 
overstate the degree of shirking because it forces firms to lose valued 
workers in the process.125 
A parallel analysis explains the observed behavior of firms in re-
124. See id. at 248-49. 
125. See Michael H. Riordan & Michael L. Wachter, What Do Implicit Contracts Do?, 1982 
PROC. INDUS. REL. REs. AssN. 291, 295 (Barbara D. Dennis ed.). 
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sponse to cyclical changes in output: firms typically reduce employ-
ment rather than wage rates. Firms, but not workers, possess direct 
information about product market conditions. The firm informs its 
workforce about product market conditions indirectly through 
changes in output. If a firm could lower wages in response to a decline 
in its product market, it would have an incentive to misstate the condi-
tion of its product market in order to lower wage rates. The incentive-
compatible rule is for the firm to lay off workers. Because the result of 
the layoffs is a reduction in output, and hence a reduction in the firm's 
revenues and profits, such a rule eliminates the firm's incentive to mis-
state information.126 
The rules concerning firms that exit an industry parallel those gov-
erning temporary layoffs. A firm retains the right to decide unilater-
ally to go out of business, just as the worker enjoys the unilateral right 
to quit the firm. 127 The process of going out of business, however, is 
frequently a prolonged one. Stylized rules have evolved to govern the 
"effects" on workers of the decision to close: firms typically lay off 
workers over time using a seniority schedule; workers typically receive 
some severance pay and always receive their pension rights; if firms 
discharge older workers before younger ones, they do so through vol-
untary retirement mechanisms in which the "contract" of the older 
workers is bought out. These process rules are almost always part of 
union contracts.12s 
The rule that firms can unilaterally implement a decision to go out 
of business has strong incentive-compatible properties. Once out of 
business, the firm has lost whatever value is in the ILM. Hence, the 
firm will only close when the ILM is indeed unprofitable. The rules 
governing the process control the firm's incentives to profit from the 
process, or to pretend to be going out of business, by imposing direct 
costs (severance pay or voluntary retirement programs) and indirect 
costs (laying off less expensive junior workers before more expensive 
senior workers) on such a firm. 
The above analysis extends to successorship. The key factor driv-
ing the incentive-compatible rules in this area is that the firm and the 
match-specific workers have an ongoing interest in preserving an ILM 
when it generates a surplus over the ELM. When the ILM generates 
126. For a general discussion of contracts that control firm strategic behavior with respect to 
product market conditions, see id. at 250. 
127. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington, 380 U.S. 263, 268, 271 (1965); see also First Natl. 
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 668, 677 (1981). 
128. LLOYD G. REYNOLDS, STANLEY H. MASTERS, & COLLETTA H. MOSER, LABOR Eco-
NOMICS & LABOR RELATIONS 471-76 (10th ed. 1991). For a general discussion of how parties 
use stylized rules to adapt to changes in circumstances, see Riordan & Wachter, supra note 125. 
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economic losses, the long-run joint profits of the firm and the workers 
would be improved by establishing a new ILM. The obligations of the 
surviving firm turn on whether or not the firm reestablishes or retains 
the ILM of the old firm. 
C. The Problem Faced by Labor Law Successorship Doctrine 
From an ILM perspective, three situations are of interest in deter-
mining whether successorship doctrine deters rent seeking. 
Case A: The ILM of the old firm creates a surplus; the new firm 
recognizes that the ILM creates a surplus; and the new firm, in order to 
preserve the efficient ILM, willingly retains the old firm's employees and 
assumes the CBA and the duty to bargain. Case A apparently character-
izes most changes of control and rarely leads to litigation. 129 When the 
new firm wishes to acquire the old firm as a going business, and to con-
tinue it as such, the new firm has no reason to disrupt established and 
efficient labor relations. Consolidations are difficult enough without 
making them more so by sowing discord. The easiest way to accomplish 
Case A transitions is by a merger or stock sale. 
Case B: The ILM of the old firm is defective, either creating no sur-
plus or incurring losses; the new firm recognizes that the old ILM is 
defective; the new firm reconfigures the operations, including personnel 
practices and structures, and hires few if any of the old firm's workers. 
Case B transitions are typically asset sales. Case B cases are largely self-
enforcing: the firm makes credible its assertion that the ILM generates 
no surplus by jettisoning it. By dissolving the old ILM, the firm pre-
cludes itself from capturing joint surplus generated by that ILM. 
Case C: The ILM of the old firm is efficient, but the new firm denies 
that any surplus exists; at the same time, the new firm attempts to cap-
ture the joint surplus by hiring most of the old firm's employees at a 
wage closer to the employees' opportunity wage and by refusing to bar-
gain collectively. In Case C, the new firm tries to have it both ways. It 
tries to maintain an efficient ILM while reducing the share of the joint 
surplus paid to the workers. Unlike Case B situations, the new firm's 
representation is not self-enforcing. By (mis)representing that no joint 
surplus exists, perhaps by threatening not to hire the old workers except 
at lower wages, the firm creates a basis for reducing workers' wages -
and thus their share of the surplus - while at the same time maintaining 
and benefiting from the efficient ILM. 
The task of labor law successorship doctrine, then, is best under-
stood as facilitating Case A and Case B transitions, while preventing 
Case C transitions. A failure to control the opportunistic behavior of 
Case C will undermine the creation and maintenance of productive 
ILMs. 
129. This is an anecdotal impression. We do not know of any evidence on the relative fre-
quency of Cases A, B, and C. 
238 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:203 
IV. USING ILM THEORY To UNDERSTAND THE LABOR LAW 
SUCCESSORSHIP DOCTRINES 
As we have seen above, substantial continuity in operations and 
workforce plays an important but different role in each box of the tax-
onomy. Strikingly, the substantial continuity test that forms the core 
of the labor law successorship doctrine roughly tracks the continuity 
of the ILM. In determining whether substantial continuity in opera-
tions and workforce exists, the courts and the Board examine a 
number of factors: 
whether the business of both employers is essentially the same; whether 
the employees of the new company are doing the same jobs in the same 
working conditions under the same supervisors; and whether the new 
entity has the same production process, produces the same products, and 
basically has the same body of customers. 130 
Finally, the courts and the Board examine whether there is substantial 
overlap in the identity of the employees. These factors rather precisely 
describe the situations in which the new firm retains the old firm's 
ILM. Thus, the substantial continuity test identifies those cases in 
which the new firm is in a position to act opportunistically. In this 
Part, we describe how labor law successorship doctrine can be under-
stood as an attempt to control opportunistic behavior by firms - and, 
to a lesser extent, by employees - that can threaten productive ILMs. 
A. Column 1: Merger and Stock Sales 
1. Box 1: Obligations Under the CBA After a Merger or Stock Sale 
As previously discussed, a merger or stock sale does not affect 
rights and obligations under the CBA. 131 In the normal case, Case A, 
the new 0wners desire to acquire the old firm as a going concern, in-
cluding its ILM either by means of a stock sale or a merger. The rule 
of Box 1 facilitates such transitions and protects third parties by leav-
ing intact rights and liabilities of the old firm. The rule limits the op-
portunities for the contracting parties - both the employer and the 
union - to demand renegotiation of contracts at the delicate and vul-
nerable period during which control is transferred. 132 The typical fact 
130. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 43 (1987). 
131. See supra notes SS-63 and accompanying text. 
132. The battle for control of United Airlines provides a good example of the strategic use of 
renegotiation at the point that control is transferred. During the pilot union's attempt to gain 
control of United, the machinists formed a coalition with the management and inserted a provi-
sion in the collective bargaining agreement which terminated the machinists' collective bargain-
ing agreement upon change of control. This action posed a substantial barrier to the pilots' 
attempt to gain control because it gave the machinists the option to strike upon a change of 
control and would therefore discourage lenders who preferred not to "lend into a strike." The 
managers benefited from this provision insofar as it discouraged bids, while the machinists bene-
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pattern for a Box 1 case is a stock sale after which the new owners 
repudiate the old CBA while accepting the benefits of corporate con-
tinuity, including tax benefits and the continuation of advantageous 
contracts, leases, or licenses.133 
Note how the essentially categorical rule of Box 1 prevents the 
opportunistic behavior of Case C Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB 134 provides 
a wonderful example. Esmark, a conglomerate, owned the leading 
meat packer, Swift & Co. Swift's fresh meat operations had been los-
ing money. Esmark claimed that, although Swift's plants were effi-
cient in that the workers were productive and the output was of high 
quality, the wage rates at two (Moultrie and Guymon) rendered them 
uncompetitive in comparison to other plants in the industry. Esmark 
thus attempted to retain their ILMs but to lower wage rates by reorga-
nizing operations in such a way as to put the two plants outside the 
master CBA. In addition, Esmark wanted to sell sixty-five percent of 
the fresh meat operations to the public, retaining a thirty-five percent 
interest. Five days before the public offering, Esmark closed the 
Moultrie and Guymon plants and laid off the workers. Eight days 
after the public offering; an official of New Sipco, the subsidiary that 
now held the two plants, informed the union that it would reopen 
them and that, as a "successor employer," it would unilaterally set 
(lower) wage rates. 
Esmark's public sale of sixty-five percent of the stock in the subsid-
iary holding the fresh meat operations presented a classic Box 1 situa-
tion: Does the corporation remain bound by its obligations under the 
CBA after the sale of a majority of its stock to new owners? Following 
Wiley, the court affirmed the Board's holding that the obligations sur-
vived the stock sale.13s 
The corporate law considerations discussed earlier show why this 
result makes sense. In this case, one purpose of using a stock sale 
rather than an asset sale was to maintain and transfer the enterprise 
intact, including its ILM.136 In such circumstances, to treat the firm's 
fited to the extent that it allowed them to claim a share of any merger gains. See John C. Coffee, 
Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-Player Game, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495 
(1990). 
133. See, e.g., Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739, 744-45 (7th Cir. 1989); EPE, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 845 F.2d 483, 486 (4th Cir. 1988); General Teamsters Local Union No. 249 v. Bill's 
Trucking, Inc., 493 F.2d 956, 958 (3d Cir. 1974); Phillip Wall & Sons, Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. 1161, 
1163-64 (1988); Topinka's Country House, Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 72, 73 (1978). 
134. 887 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1989). . 
135. 887 F.2d at 752. 
136. As the court noted: 
Esmark deliberately chose to dispose of Swift's fresh meats division as an ongoing, self-
sufficient enterprise, rather than to sell its physical assets piecemeal. Esmark undoubtedly 
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obligations to its· employees less favorably than its contracts with 
others, allowing the firm to pick and choose which of its obligations to 
its employees to adopt, would undermine a transactional form whose 
value lies largely in the way it predictably and maximally maintains 
continuity. 137 Undermining the categorical quality of the merger-
stock sale rule, in tum, would invite opportunistic behav;or by the 
employer and the union in the Case A situations that, under current 
doctrine, pass largely unlitigated. 
In contrast to these typical Box 1 cases, sometimes a merger results 
in the old firm's absorption into the surviving firm, with the work and 
workers dispersed and integrated or dismissed. 138 This represents a 
Case B type situation: by integrating the old ILM into its existing 
ILM, the firm indicates that it does not believe the old ILM is generat-
ing a surplus. 139 In the Wiley case, for example, the Interscience 
workers were integrated into the larger Wiley workforce. 
Under the rule of Box 1, these employees receive the same protec-
tion as other creditors of the firm. The surviving firm is liable for any 
obligations under the old CBA. At the same time, the surviving firm 
has no greater obligations than the old firm. Just as the old firm typi-
cally could dissolve the ILM by changing the nature of its operations 
so significantly as to render the old CBA inapplicable, so too can the 
new firm. 140 When, as in the Wiley case, the new firm credibly asserts 
that it does not value the old ILM - either by integrating the workers 
into its larger operations or by not retaining the old workers - it may 
believed that the form of the transaction would be advantageous, due to the tax conse· 
quences and because Sipco's contracts (including favorable loan agreements, leases and con· 
tracts with suppliers and customers) would continue in force. 
887 F.2d at 751. 
137. The court seemed to be searching for this view in Esmark without ever quite articulat· 
ing it. In rejecting Esmark's argument, the court stated that adoption "would undermine the 
fundamental goal of the federal labor laws, which is to ensure industrial peace and stability. An 
employee should not have to wonder whether his employer will continue to adhere to his con· 
tractual obligations every time the employer's stock is traded on a stock exchange." 887 F.2d at 
752. But why should the employee have that reassurance? One answer is that such reassurance 
is just and promotes industrial peace, As a legal theory, however, that answer does not explain 
the cases: if reassurance promotes justice and industrial peace here, why not also guarantee it in 
cases involving a sale of assets (Box 3) or a shift of work (Box 5)? The background corporate law 
theory offers an alternative explanation for why the reassurance is critical, an explanation that 
can distinguish between Box 1 cases like Esmark and Box 3 and Box 5 cases like Howard Johnson 
and Burns. See also cases cited supra note 133, in which the stock purchaser tried to avoid the 
obligations under the CBA, while enjoying benefits of other continuing contracts, licenses, or 
leases. 
138. See, e.g., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964) (dispersed and 
integrated); Lauer's Furniture Stores, Inc. 246 N.L.R.B. 360 (1979) (dismissed). 
139. Or, at least, that the surplus is less than that generated by its own ILM. 
140. This, of course, assumes that the CBA does not have a clause restricting the changes 
under consideration. Like others linked to the firm by contract, the bargained-for rights of either 
the firm or the union will be protected. 
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do so. Such an assertion is credible because, by dissolving the old 
ILM, the firm precludes itself from capturing any surplus generated by 
the old ILM. 
Here, then, is an important contrast between Esmark and Wiley. 
In Esmark, the surviving firm could not claim that the CBA became 
inapplicable because of permitted changes in the organization of the 
work and workers: the operations at the two plants continued entirely. 
unchanged. By contrast, in Wiley, the Interscience workforce was 
completely absorbed into the larger Wiley operation, a reorganization 
permitted under the CBA. The rule of Box 1 thus provides the neces-
sary flexibility to reorganize or dissolve an ILM when it fails to gener-
ate a surplus, without interfering with the efficient - and largely 
uncontested - transfer of going concerns. Placing the burden on the 
employer to establish lack of continuity is consistent with our casual 
observation that, in the normal Box 1 case, the surviving firm or stock 
purchaser will keep the old ILM intact. 
2. Box 2: Obligations Under the NLRA After a 
Merger or Stock Sale 
The rule of Box 2 follows that of Box 1: after a merger or stock 
sale, the surviving firm has the same duty to bargain as the old firm. 
The corporate and ILM perspectives largely account for this result. In 
Case A situations, the most common type, this rule maximally pre-
serves continuity. At the same time, in Case B situations, when the 
new firm believes that the old ILM is unproductive, the rule provides 
the same way out as was available to the old firm. If the new firm can 
meet the burden of establishing that the union does not have contin-
ued majority support, then it need not bargain. As previously dis-
cussed, to establish this the new firm, like the old firm, must establish 
lack of continuity in operations and workforce. 141 
While permitting a way out of the duty to bargain for firms that in 
fact do not desire to continue the old ILM, however, this rule largely 
blocks the Case C attempt to have the best of both worlds, that is, the 
attempt to benefit from the old ILM while repudiating the duty to 
bargain. In the classic Case C situation, the new owners retain the old 
ILM but attempt to secure a greater share of the joint surplus. The 
new owners, for example, may misinterpret the condition of the prod-
uct markets. "Sales are bad," the new owner might say, "we just can't 
afford to maintain the old wage rates." Alternatively, the new owner 
may attempt to maintain the old ILM organization but eliminate the 
141. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. 
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old workers .. Box 2 blocks both strategies. Thus, in Esmark, in which 
the old firm was preserved entirely intact with the same workers and 
the same operations, the court correctly held that the duty to bargain 
continued unchanged through the sale of stock. Because the ILM 
continued, the new owner could not rebut the presumption of contin-
ued majority support. 
But now contrast Esmark with Spencer Foods 142 and Rockwood 
Energy. 143 Spencer Foods presents the trickier case. The original own-
ers closed the plant and laid off the workers. After an eighteen-month 
hiatus, following a stock sale, the new owners reorganized operations 
slightly and reopened the plant. The new Spencer Foods refused to 
bargain with the old union, accepted applications from all interested 
persons - including former employees - but hired only a very small 
proportion of former Spencer employees. The union charged - and 
the administrative law judge, the Board, and the court all agreed -
that Spencer Foods relied 011 hiring criteria designed to keep the for-
mer unionized Spencer employees to a minimum and thus keep the 
union out of the plant.144 
The court held that, because the layoffs were not intended to be 
permanent, but only part of the "sale of an ongoing business enterprise 
to [Land O'Lakes], i.e., a business which encompassed the resumed 
operations of the Spencer plant by [Spencer Foods] albeit under new 
management,"145 and because there was an expectation that the plant 
would be reopened, the duty to bargain carried forward beyond the 
expiration of the CBA and through the hiatus. Moreover, the court 
held that applying discriminatory criteria to avoid rehiring old work-
ers was itself an unfair labor practice. 
From the ILM perspective, Spencer Foods is more problematic 
than Esmark At first blush, it seems to involve a classic Case B situa-
tion: the new Spencer Foods, by not rehiring the old employees, made 
clear that it did not value the old ILM. The old Spencer Food's his-
tory of poor labor relations is consistent with this hypothesis. While 
in Esmark the firm attempted to have it both ways - to retain the 
ILM but avoid bargaining with the union - the new Spencer Foods 
put its money on the line. How, then, could Spencer Foods have been 
behaving opportunistically? 
Doctrinally, the answer is straightforward: antiunion animus is al-
142. United Food & Commercial Workers Intl. Union v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 
1985). 
143. NLRB v. Rockwood Energy & Mineral Corp., 942 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1991). 
144. 768 F.2d at 1475. 
145. 768 F.2d at 1472. 
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ways an unfair labor practice.146 Moreover, the economic rationale 
for this general rule is similarly straightforward. Without such a bar, 
workers would be unable to escape from their free-rider problems and 
bargain collectively. Hence, if unions can facilitate efficient con-
tracting in ILMs, a rule prohibiting antiunion animus is necessary. 
But the successorship context itself also provides an answer. Con-
sider a broader time frame. Suppose that in the first period the firm 
refuses to rehire former employees in order to keep· out the union, but 
during the second period it rehires the skilled former employees as it 
terminates the unskilled and inexperienced new hires.147 Under such 
circumstances, in the second period the workers would have to bear 
the cost and delay of reorganizing and renegotiating, having just suf-
fered an extended layoff due to their union membership. By delaying 
the reestablishment of the efficient ILM in order to eliminate the 
union, the firm might secure a greater share of the joint surplus. In-
deed, more generally, given that the division of the joint surplus -
like other bilateral monopolies - depends on the bargaining abilities 
of the participants, investing in a reputation for toughness may be 
worthwhile.148 
Note the limitations of this explanation. In this two-period strat-
egy, the firm incurs a cost during the first period: it forgoes its share of 
the joint surplus of the efficient ILM and risks losing employees in 
whom it has made a match-specific investment. The strategy makes 
sense only if the employer can recoup this investment, with interest, in 
the second period - either after it reestablishes the old ILM, or from 
an increased share of the joint surplus from other ILMs within the 
firm, that is, from other divisions.149 In Spencer Foods, this is a plausi-
ble scenario in that Land O'Lakes had numerous other divisions. 
Moreover, had there been no litigation, Spencer Foods could have 
146. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 8(a)(3), 61 
Stat. 136, 140 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988)); Textile Workers Union v. 
Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965). See generally 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, 
supra note 1, at 185-249, 275-84. 
147. Spencer Foods provides one possible example. The Board found that, in the first year 
following the sale of assets, Spencer Foods hired approximately 525 individuals, released 250, 
and sought to fill 220 projected periods; the Board noted the relative inexperience of many hires. 
United Food & Commercial Workers Intl. Union v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 1463, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 
1985). 
148. The classic case of antiunion animus, Darlington, rested on similar concerns. The Court 
reasoned that Darlington closed one of its plants to teach workers in its other plants not to 
unionize. 380 U.S. at 275-76. 
149. Predatory pricing in antitrust provides an analogous case. In a predatory pricing strat-
egy, a firm lowers its prices below cost to drive competitors out of the market and, having gained 
market power, charges an above-competitive price. Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993); see also Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory 
Pricing and Related Priorities Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975). 
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been expected to rehire the experienced workers as it fired the inexpe-
rienced workers. But, if recoupment is impossible, it is unlikely that 
the initial decision was opportunistic. 150 
In contrast to the court's analysis in Spencer Foods, Rockwood En-
ergy 151 seems inconsistent with the goal of preventing opportunistic 
behavior. In 1981, Harmony Mining Co. entered into a collective bar-
gaining agreement effective through September 1984. The CBA pro-
vided that "[e]mployees who are idle because of a reduction in the 
working force shall be placed on a panel from which they shall be 
returned to employment on the basis of seniority."152 In May, 1982, 
Harmony suspended production and laid off forty unit employees. In 
1983, Rockwood Energy and Mineral Corp., Harmony's major credi-
tor, acquired all of Rockwood's stock. In 1985, after the termination 
of the CBA, Harmony unilaterally began to change the terms for the 
sole remaining unit employee. In 1986, Harmony hired one additional 
nonunion employee to do work that union members had previously 
performed. In 1987, Harmony resumed production, hiring two addi-
tional employees without regard to the panel, of whom only one was a 
former union member. Four laid-off union members inquired about 
jobs but were told that the company was not accepting applications. 153 
The union requested bargaining and, when Harmony refused, filed 
an unfair labor practice complaint. The Board ordered that Harmony 
recognize and bargain with the union, that Harmony not unilaterally 
change the terms and conditions of employment established by the 
now expired CBA, and that Harmony recall laid-off employees in ac-
cordance with the seniority provisions of the CBA. 154 The Third Cir-
cuit enforced the order, finding that the Board had reasonably held 
that the new employer was a "continuation" of the old notwithstand-
ing the long hiatus in production and lack of substantial work force 
continuity. 155 The obligations under the prior CBA and the duty to 
bargain both carried over. 
150. As in the analogous case of predatory pricing. See, e.g., Brook Group, 113 S. Ct. at 
2588-89 (holding that a plaintiff must show that its competitor had a reasonable prospect of 
recouping its investment in below-cost prices to recover damages in an action for predatory pric-
ing). 
This explanation has an important problem. If employees know of a firm's reputation as 
antiunion before they invest in the match, then workers in the competitive external labor market 
should demand a premium for joining this particular firm. In such cases, the firm would likely 
bear the cost of its reputation. 
151. NLRB v. Rockwood Energy & Mineral Corp., 942 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1991). 
152. 942 F.2d at 172. 
153. 942 F.2d at 172. 
154. 942 F.2d at 172-73. 
155. 942 F.2d at 174-75. 
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In contrast to Esmark and Spencer Foods, the facts here, though 
not entirely clear, suggest that Rockwood Energy presents a Case B 
situation. The fundamental change in operations associated with re-
ducing from forty workers to four, combined with the company's deci-
sion not to rehire the old employees, suggests that Rockwood Energy 
involves a self-enforcing statement that the old ILM generated no sur-
plus. By terminating the old ILM, the company precluded itself from 
acting opportunistically. But we have too few facts to understand 
Rockwood Energy fully. If, for example, the company were to expand 
its operations back to its former level, with forty employees, then the 
case would resemble Spencer Foods. 
Under this analysis, the opportunistic behavior present in Esmark 
makes clear that the sale of stock does not and should not affect the 
duty to bargain. Rather, the ILM perspective suggests that the sub-
stantial continuity determination - that is, the question whether the 
ILM is carried forward - should be critical to deciding whether the 
duty to bargain continues. When, as apparently occurred in Rock-
wood Energy, the firm constrains itself from behaving opportunisti-
cally by disbanding the old ILM, imposing a duty to bargain is likely 
to reduce joint profits. Moreover, because the purpose of imposing 
such a duty is to preclude opportunistic or wasteful strategic behavior, 
its imposition serves no purpose in such a context. Focusing directly 
on substantial continuity, moreover, promotes these purposes more ef-
fectively than focusing on the existence of continued majority union 
support in the workforce - the traditional, and doctrinal, test. 156 
Rockwood Energy, for instance, may have been able to rebut a pre-
sumption of majority status. Doing so, however, would have been 
quite costly, dissipating the efficiency gains from its reorganization of 
the company. 
B. Column 2: Sale of Assets 
In the paradigmatic sale of assets, the asset purchaser wishes only 
to acquire pieces of the asset seller, not to acquire the asset seller as a 
going concern. The normal Column 2 case is thus a Case B situation: 
the asset purchaser does not value the old ILM and, by jettisoning it, 
precludes itself from capturing any of the old ILM's joint surplus. 
Importantly, Case B situations are largely self-enforcing. In these 
cases, the firm's representation that the old ILM is inefficient, com-
bined with the firm's actions in reconfiguring the assets and not hiring 
156. For a discussion of the traditional majority support test, see supra notes 65-68 and 
accompanying text. 
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the old workers, makes the assertion inherently credible. By dissolv-
ing the old ILM, the firm puts its money where its mouth is. While 
the firm may be wrong - it may be that, contrary to the firm's asser-
tion, the old ILM creates joint surplus - it cannot be acting 
opportunistically. 
Thus, in the Case B situation, in which the asset purchaser does 
not continue the old operation or hire the old workers, there is no 
continuing ILM that requires protection; hence the law treats the for-
mer workers exactly the same as any other creditor of the firm. When 
the ILM is discontinued, the backward-looking corporate law protec-
tion of creditors of the asset seller protects former employees' contrac-
tual claims. Workers may collect from the asset seller anything to 
which they are contractually entitled under the CBA - for example, 
unpaid wages, accrued vacation pay, accrued pension contributions, 
and so forth - but that is all. The asset purchaser has no special 
obligations to the seller's employees. 
Moreover, such a rule helps to discourage both the destruction of 
productive ILMs and the preservation of unproductive ILMs. An 
ILM may be inefficient because the workers have used their right to 
strike to extract a contract that transfers the firm's share of the surplus 
to the workers. 157 Similarly, workers may want to retain an ILM 
which is inefficient for other reasons in order to maintain contract pro-
visions that return a surplus to them, even when the firm is generating 
losses. In both cases, a predecessor firm stuck with such an inefficient 
ILM can jettison it through an asset sale. Faced with the potential 
exit of the firm through an asset sale, workers will be less likely to use 
their bargaining power to extract a surplus that leaves the firm with 
losses. 
That the prototypical Column 2 case involves an inefficient ILM 
also explains why Column 2 has different rules than Column 1. The 
corporate law goal of encouraging efficient restructuring of those as-
sets that do not generate a surplus, while retaining those that do, re-
quires standard form mechanisms that can be applied to the two 
situations at low cost. This explains why Wiley, contrary to the expec-
tations of traditional labor law scholars, did not apply to Column 2. 158 
Of course, as in the corporate context, a background rule that asset 
purchasers do not take on the seller's obligations creates the potential 
for Case C strategic manipulation. This rule offers asset purchasers an 
opportunity to retain the productive old ILM, but secure a larger 
157. See infra the discussion of "potentially efficient" ILMs in note 172 and accompanying 
text. 
158. See supra section II.C. 
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share of the joint surplus, by using an asset sale rather than a merger 
in order to escape from the old CBA and the duty to bargain. Conse-
quently, asset buyers and sellers will have an incentive to share in the 
additional portion of the joint surplus that the sale captures from the 
employees. 
The challenge for the legal rule is to preserve the necessary option 
of dissolving an inefficient ILM and disposing of assets while blocking 
the opportunistic use of that transactional form. The rules of Boxes 3 
and 4 represent an attempt to do this. Because Box 3 poses the most 
difficult questions, we will first examine the rule of Box 4. 
1. Box 4: Obligations Under the NLRA After an Asset Sale 
Recall the rule of Box 4: when there is no substantial continuity, 
there is no duty to bargain collectively until the union establishes ma-
jority support; when there is substantial continuity, majority support is 
presumed, and the firm must bargain collectively until it establishes 
lack of majority support. 159 As discussed above, when the asset pur-
chaser jettisons the old ILM, as demonstrated by lack of substantial 
continuity, no danger exists of opportunistic behavior on the part of 
the firm. But when the asset purchaser retains the old ILM, a poten-
tial for opportunistic behavior arises that courts must constrain in or-
der to facilitate optimal investments in ILMs. 
The necessity of controlling this sort of opportunistic behavior pro-
vides an explanation for why labor law successorship doctrine grants 
greater protection to employees than corporate law successorship doc-
trine grants to creditors generally. In the general corporate case, 
courts protect creditors either by requiring that the asset seller make 
provision for long-tail claimants before dissolution or by using asset 
purchasers as a conduit to impose the costs on asset sellers. But the 
ILM differs significantly: labor law successorship doctrine must pro-
tect the forward-looking, match-specific investments in the continuing 
ILM. 
The duty to bargain is critical to labor law's attempt to constrain 
opportunistic behavior while facilitating nonopportunistic reconfigura-
tions of assets. Here we must clarify the content of the duty to bargain 
and the extent to which it can protect employees. In referring to a 
"duty to bargain," we are referring to the weak, procedural version of 
the duty: an obligation to meet and confer "in good faith" over 
mandatory topics, without any obligation to reach an agreement. 160 
159. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. 
160. See generally 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 1, ch. 13. 
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Such a duty to bargain will facilitate the renegotiation of terms and 
conditions equivalent to those in the prior ILM. But this duty only 
protects workers in whom the firm has made productive investments. 
It does nothing to protect employees who are easily replaced. In par-
ticular, the duty to bargain will not allow such employees to protect 
any union wage premiums that they previously secured in the old 
CBA.161 
The duty to bargain constrains opportunistic behavior in this con-
text in two ways. First, by relieving the union from the burden of 
showing majority support - with the attendant costs of organizing 
and costs of delay - imposing a duty to bargain lowers the employees' 
costs of protecting or reestablishing the bargain over the division of 
the joint surplus that they had previously struck with the asset seller. 
Second, by forcing the asset buyer to corroborate claims regarding the 
condition of the product markets, this duty makes it more difficult for 
the new employer to secure a greater share of the joint surplus by 
misrepresentation. 
Consider, for example, Fall River, 162 in which a majority of the 
asset purchaser's workforce had worked for the asset seller, doing es-
sentially the same work. In such circumstances, employees face a con-
tinuing danger that the purchaser will act opportunistically, claiming 
that the ILM is inefficient in order to appropriate a portion of the joint 
surplus while at the same time taking full benefit of its value. Impos-
ing a duty to bargain helps to maintain the presumptively efficient 
ILM while preventing the asset purchaser from using the uncertainty 
of the changeover to secure a greater share of the joint surplus. 
Moreover, such a rule imposes a minimal burden on the asset pur-
chaser. If the purchaser values the ILM, as demonstrated by its deci-
sion to continue operations and to hire the old employees, then it must 
continue the practice of bargaining collectively. If, on the other hand, 
the purchaser does not value the ILM, it will not hire the old employ-
ees and will have no obligation to bargain collectively. Indeed, in Fall 
River the Supreme Court seemed largely to have made a version of this 
argument: 
Thus, to a substantial extent the applicability of Burns rests in the hands 
161. The extent to which labor law should or does protect union wage premia for unskilled 
workers is a controversial topic and well beyond the scope of this article. For one view of this 
topic, see generally Michael Wachter, Union Wage Rigidity: The Default Settings of Labar Law, 
AM. EcoN. REV., May 1986, at 240. However one comes out on the normative issue, most agree 
that the NLRA as applied provides relatively little protection for workers easily replaced in the 
ELM. Labor law successorship doctrine, as reconstructed here, is thus no less protective of such 
workers than other areas of labor law. 
162. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987). 
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of the successor. If the new employer makes a conscious decision to 
maintain generally the same business and to hire a majority of its em-
ployees from the predecessor, then the bargaining obligation of§ 8(a)(5) 
is activated. This makes sense when one considers that the employer 
intends to take advantage of the trained work force of its predecessor. 163 
The rule prohibiting discrimination against employees of the asset 
seller on the basis of their union membership reenters at this point.164 
As with Box 2, if the asset purchaser could maintain operations un-
changed but escape from the duty to bargain - by refusing to hire 
former union members or by refusing to recognize the union - then 
an opportunity would exist for unproductive strategic behavior.165 
The rule against antiunion animus blocks this prospect. If an asset 
purchaser leaves operations unchanged but employs practices that ef-
fectively exclude former union employees, such action constitutes evi-
dence of antiunion animus. After all, so long as operations are 
unchanged, one would expect that the old employees in whom the firm 
has made match-specific investments would be the most attractive can-
didates. If a firm disproportionally excludes the most attractive appli-
cants, one can infer that it excluded them in order to keep out the 
union. 166 By contrast, when no substantial continuity in operations 
exists, no such inference arises. To the extent that the operations are 
changed, the match-specific investments in and by the old employees 
have little value - indeed, they may even impose a cost - and criteria 
of selection that have the effect of hiring new workers do not suggest 
animus. 
But this ILM explanation for the rule of Box 4 presents a puzzle: 
if the duty to bargain is part of the old ILM and is therefore appropri-
ately imposed on an asset purchaser who retains the old ILM, why not 
also impose the old CBA, which is its constitutive document? The 
doctrinal answer has been that the NLRA prevents the imposition of 
an agreement on a firm. But that justification begs the question: it 
does not explain why the NLRA should distinguish betwee~ asset pur-
chasers - who are not necessarily deemed to adopt a CBA even if 
they hire a majority of the employees - and stock purchasers, who 
are deemed to accept the existing CBA. 
163. 482 U.S. at 40-41. 
164. See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text. 
165. See supra text accompanying notes 146-50. 
166. See, e.g., United States Marine Corp. v. NLRB, 944 F.2d 1305, 1315-17 (D.C. Cir. 
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1474 (1992); United Food & Commercial Workers Intl. Union v. 
NLRB, 768 F.2d 1463, 1474-76 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
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2. Box 3: Obligations Under the CBA After an Asset Sale 
As discussed earlier, the rule governing Box 3 is complex. In gen-
eral, when a firm acquires assets, it need not fulfil the obligations of the 
seller's collective bargaining agreement, unless it agrees to accept 
those obligations. 167 The Board and the courts have outlined the cir-
cumstances in which they will hold that a firm has agreed to take on 
the seller's CBA in the Spruce Up doctrine. 168 Proof of substantial 
continuity in operations and workforce seems to make it significantly 
more likely that the Board and courts will find that the CBA has been 
adopted, evidence which the asset purchaser can rebut with a clear 
statement at the outset that it does not intend to adhere to the old 
CBA. The uncertain and fact-specific nature of the legal rule puts 
pressure on the purchaser to declare its intentions, explicitly rejecting 
the old CBA at the outset if it does not wish to adhere to it. 
This complex rule seems to be a necessarily imperfect solution to a 
difficult problem. The core of the Box 3 rule comports with ILM con-
siderations. A new owner who wishes to redeploy the assets of the 
firm might find that goal difficult to accomplish if bound by an existing 
CBA. Allowing the new owner to reject the CBA thus furthers the 
corporate law goal of encouraging the mobility of assets to the most 
profitable use. Moreover, when an asset purchaser acquires assets but 
redeploys them and hires new employees, we face an obvious Case B 
situation. By dissolving the old ILM, the asset purchaser precludes 
itself from acting opportunistically. 
Howard Johnson 169 presents just such a nonopportunistic Box 3 
scenario. Howard Johnson acquired the physical assets from the Gris-
soms but chose to redeploy them and to hire new employees. By not 
hiring the old employees, Howard Johnson made it clear that it did 
not value the old ILM. Moreover, this claim was self-enforcing: by 
not hiring the old employees, it also gave up the surplus, if any, from 
the ILM. Instead, Howard Johnson sought to redeploy the assets in 
what it thought would be a more effective fashion. 
While Howard Johnson had no continuing duties to the old em-
ployees, it does not follow that the old employees had no protections. 
To the contrary, they retained all their contractual rights. Indeed, the 
Grissoms agreed to arbitrate the extent of their liability to the union 
and their former employees under the CBA. Moreover, as the Court 
pointed out, because the old employees' CBA contained a successor 
167. See supra section 11.C.1. 
168. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text. 
169. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974). 
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and assigns clause, they could have sought an injunction against the 
Grissoms to enjoin the sale as a breach of the successorship clause.17° 
But a rule that gives the asset purchaser the option to reject the old 
CBA presents the possibility of a Case C situation. The asset pur-
chaser who can retain the old ILM - as demonstrated by hiring the 
old employees and retaining the old operations - but who can reject 
the old CBA and unilaterally set terms and conditions may be able to 
capture some additional elements of the joint surplus, subject to a con-
tinuing duty to bargain. 
One mechanism for constraining such opportunistic behavior is a 
rule that would automatically impose the old CBA on the asset pur-
chaser who retained the old ILM. In such cases, the asset purchaser 
could not unilaterally set terms; rather, it would have to wait until the 
CBA expired and then bargain to impasse, or, if the CBA had already 
expired, bargain to impasse, maintaining the old terms for the year or 
two it took to do so. m 
But such a rule has its costs. In particular, when the ILM gener-
ates surpluses over the external labor market but wage premiums ex-
ceed the joint surplus, asset purchasers either will not purchase the 
assets or will not retain the ILM. Such ILMs might be termed "poten-
tially efficient" ILMs, that is, ILMs that would generate a joint sur-
plus at contract terms that fell between the old CBA and a new CBA 
and that would pass a market test of attracting new workers. In such 
circumstances, a legal rule that provides a process for the parties to 
retain such ILMs, but with different CBA terms, will maximize the 
parties' joint gains.112 
The rule of Box 3 seems to be an attempt to accomplish just such a 
goal. By rebuttably inferring the constructive adoption of the old 
CBA when substantial continuity exists, the law forces the asset pur-
chaser to reject the old CBA explicitly before it can unilaterally set 
initial terms. This obligation to reject the old CBA explicitly, com-
bined with an obligation to bargain, provides substantial protection for 
employees' match-specific investments. A firm which must repudiate 
the old CBA explicitly - at the very time it seeks both to hire the old 
170. 417 U.S. at 258 n.3. 
171. The Fifth Circuit adopted this approach in United States Gypsum Co. v. United Steel-
workers, 384 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1042 (1968). For a discussion of 
Gypsum, see supra note 96. Other courts have charted a middle ground: imposing a duty to 
bargain about initial terms but not imposing the existing CBA. See, e.g., Kallmann v. NLRB, 640 
F.2d 1094, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1981). When a CBA has not expired, this does not affect initial 
terms but reduces the time until impasse is reached. 
172. The process is thus somewhat analogous to a chapter 11 reorganization: the "going 
concern" value of the ILM is retained while the claims on the cash flow are reduced to a sustain-
able level. 
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workers at lower wages and preserve the old ILM intact - must ac-
cept the risk of disrupting its jointly profitable relationships with its 
employees during that difficult transition period. When the ILM is 
efficient, this sort of behavior is particularly risky because any gain 
may be temporary at best, given that the firm will still have a duty to 
bargain. Indeed, gains may be nonexistent because the union may get 
everything back. As a continuing participant in the ILM, moreover, 
the firm's strong interest in maintaining its reputation may also con-
strain opportunistic behavior when either the joint surplus of the pres-
ent ILM is relatively large, or the prospective gain from opportunistic 
behavior is relatively small. 
Saks & Co. v. NLRB 173 presents an example of a permissible, 
nonopportunistic scenario. Saks, which formerly shared a building 
and an alterations department with Gimbels, moved to a separate 
building. Most of the employees in Saks' new alterations department 
had worked for Gimbels on Saks alterations. Saks made it clear at the 
outset that it would not adopt Gimbels' CBA. In such a case, Saks' 
implicit assertion that the wage rates of the old ILM were uncompeti-
tive is at least partially bonded by the risk it takes of losing exper-
ienced workers. 
By contrast, NLRB v. World Evangelism, Inc. 114 presents an 
opportunistic scenario, which the rule of Box 3 blocks. World 
Evangelism (WEI) purchased a hotel-office-convention center com-
plex. Shortly before the takeover, WEI decided to retain the engineers 
but did not state whether or not it would adopt the CBA. When the 
engineers heard this, they threatened to resign unless WEI adopted the 
old CBA. WEl's representative assured the engineers that WEI would 
adopt the CBA. When the engineers subsequently presented a CBA, 
WEI refused to sign and, over the succeeding months, paid the engi-
neers below the contractual rate. Subsequently, WEI notified the 
union that it had not adopted the old CBA. In that case, WEI, having 
maintained the productive ILM intact during the critical transition 
period - the period during which the employees' bargaining power 
was at its zenith - subsequently sought to change the terms unilater-
ally, capturing a larger share of the joint surplus. The court, applying 
the Spruce Up doctrine, held WEI to the terms of the old CBA. 175 
173. 634 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1980). 
174. 656 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1981). 
175. 656 F.2d at 1355-56. Bellingham Frozen Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 626 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1125 (1981), presents a similar but less dramatic scenario. In that 
case, the asset purchaser (Bellingham) informally asked employees to remain in their current 
positions without having to reapply. It first indicated that it intended unilaterally to change the 
terms and conditions of employment a week after the changeover and transfer of operations. 
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The rule of Box 3, then, allows asset purchasers to avoid the old 
CBA even when they retain the old workforce if they explicitly reject 
the CBA in advance. One might object, however, that this rule invites 
opportunistic behavior: firm X could sell the assets of its division Y to 
firm A, while firmA sells the assets of its divisionB to firm.X. Because 
each firm could reject the CBA of the newly acquired division, firms 
would have an incentive to assist one another, reciprocally or serially, 
in escaping from collective bargaining obligations. 
Our answer to this objection lies in considering the joint effect of 
Box 3 and Box 4 rules. Recall that, while a firm that purchases assets 
may repudiate the CBA, it may still have a statutory duty to bargain. 
The bargaining obligation survives independently of the CBA and pro-
vides extra protections for workers in asset sales.176 Thus, a new 
owner who rejects the existing CBA but retains the old workers is 
likely to find that it has also retained the duty to bargain. In such 
cases, the duty to bargain provides those workers who have match-
specific investments with an opportunity to reinstate the CBA protec-
tions they enjoyed with the prior owner. The preceding objection, in 
this light, demonstrates the power of our analysis. The rule of Box 3 
reflects current law: firms legally could engage in exactly the sort of 
opportunistic behavior that the objection suggests. But there is no evi-
dence that they do. The absence of such behavior provides strong evi-
dence of the efficacy of the current legal structure in preventing 
opportunistic behavior. The duty to bargain, even without an addi-
tional duty to abide by the terms of the old CBA, seems to make this 
tempting strategy unprofitable. 177 
C. Column 3: Shift of Work 
Labor law, unlike corporate law, presents a third sort of paradigm 
case: the shift of work case. In these cases, the forward-looking na-
ture of labor law successorship doctrine most clearly comes to the 
fore. In corporate law, a competitor who takes over an account and, 
after doing so, contracts with some of the loser's input suppliers owes 
no obligations to the creditors of the loser. But labor law, with its 
focus on the potential gains to the new employer of retaining the old 
ILM, takes a different approach. As discussed above, 178 the Burns 
case holds that, in a shift of work context, the new employer who 
maintains substantial continuity, principally determined by hiring the 
176. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text. 
177. Such evidence is not, however, conclusive: firms might not engage in such behavior for 
other reasons, such as to avoid unfavorable tax consequences. 
178. See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text. 
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loser's employees, takes on a duty to bargain collectively but not a 
duty to abide by the old CBA. Again, it is useful to consider the duty 
to bargain, Box 6, before the obligations under the old CBA, Box 5. 
1. Box 6: The Duty To Bargain After a Shift of Work 
As discussed above, the rule of Box 6 is that, when there is sub· 
stantial continuity, the new employer has a duty to bargain collec· 
tively. 179 The demands of the ILM explain this obligation that departs 
so strikingly from the parallel corporate law rule. As discussed above, 
the "substantial continuity" test identifies those situations in which the 
ILM is preserved.180 The ILM is, however, both backward and for· 
ward looking: both the firm and the employees have sunk and make 
continuing firm.specific investments, investments that the governance 
device of the duty to bargain serves to protect. When the new firm 
continues the old ILM, imposing the duty to bargain protects those 
ongoing investments and thus promotes an optimal level of 
investment. 
A second theme of the shift of work cases is asymmetry of infor· 
mation and the resulting inequality of bargaining power, a factor that 
ILM theorists have identified as important in explaining ILMs. The 
new employer apparently does not act opportunistically, as it had no 
prior relationship with the employees and has no contractual relation· 
ship with the old employer. Nonetheless, the new employer is in a 
position to misrepresent its intentions strategically in order to retain 
the efficient ILM while reducing the workers' share of the joint sur· 
plus. This theme appears clearly in Fall River: "During a transition 
between employers, a union is in a peculiarly vulnerable position. It 
has no formal and established bargaining relationship with the new 
employer, is uncertain about the new employer's plans, and cannot be 
sure if or when the new employer must bargain with it."181 To explain 
the imposition of the duty to bargain, an element of opportunism, 
asymmetric information, or unequal bargaining power is necessary. 
Otherwise, one would expect that if, indeed, the duty to bargain facili· 
tates optimal investment in the ILM, the new firm would voluntarily 
bargain collectively. 
The Burns 182 case illustrates both features of the analysis. In re· 
hiring the Wackenhut guards to perform the same work in the same 
plant in largely the same way, Burns acknowledged by its actions the 
179. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text. 
180. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
181. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 39 (1987). 
182. NLRB v. Bums Intl. Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972). 
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fundamental soundness of the Wackenhut ILM. If;as labor law im-
plicitly assumes, the duty to bargain is the low-cost procedural mecha-
nism for the establishment and maintenance of efficient ILMs, one 
would expect Burns to have accepted it voluntarily. But by assuming 
this duty Burns would have given up an important bargaining chip: 
the ability to capture a greater share of the joint surplus by misrepre-
senting to the old employees the state of the product market, the em-
ployment markets, or the efficiency of the ILM while taking advantage 
of the employees' costs of reorganizing a union and the attendant 
delay. 
Similarly, in Spruce Up, 183 the new concessionaire expressed a will-
ingness to hire the old barbers although it rejected the old CBA. By 
doing so, Spruce Up made clear that it valued the old ILM. In such 
circumstances, to force employees to reestablish a duty to bargain 
would disrupt the governance structure of an efficient ILM, giving 
Spruce Up an opportunity to grab a larger share of the joint surplus. 184 
As in Box 4, however, the new employer has no obligation to re-
tain the predecessor's employees, nor has it any duty to bargain if 
those workers are not retained. Both of these rules protect nonoppor-
tunistic, self-enforcing decisions, as was true in Box 4. 
In his Burns dissent, Justice Rehnquist questioned the relationship 
between the Burns majority opinion and the successorship issues in 
Box 6. He pointed out that, although the Court "studiously avoids 
using the term 'successorship' . . . it affirms the conclusions of the 
Board and the Court of Appeals ... which were based entirely on the 
successorship doctrine." 185 Justice Rehnquist then concluded that the 
Burns employees should be protected in the transfer of assets in the 
same manner as nonlabor claimants, rather than enjoy additional 
claims not tied to the assets actually transferred. 186 This conclusion, 
of course, would be the correct result if Box 6 were backward looking, 
as is corporate law when it applies a conduit theory to protect long-
tailed tort claimants. Box 6, however, looks forward and is tied to the 
continuity of the ILM. The retention of the ILM, and its future sur-
183. Spruce Up Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 194 (1974), enforced, 529 F.2d 516 (4th Cir. 1975). 
184. For essentially identical situations, see NLRB v. New Medico Health Care Ctr., 951 
F.2d 350 (6th Cir. 1991) (opinion at No. 91-5271, 1991 WL 276260 (Dec. 20, 1991)), cert. denied, 
112 S. Ct. 2965 (1992); Auto Mechanics Local Lodge No. 1101 v. NLRB, 945 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 
1991) (opinion at No. 90-70096, 1991WL197005 (Oct. 3, 1991)); Nazareth Regional High Sch. 
v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 873 (3d Cir. 1977). 
185. 406 U.S. at 296 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
186. 406 U.S. at 304-05 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also 
supra note 109. 
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plus, are the key issues, rather than the disposition of the physical 
assets. 
Still, Box 6 cases are unusual. Typically, the retention of the ILM 
involves the retention of the physical assets of the ILM. The decision 
to scrap the old assets is likely to relate closely to the decision to scrap 
the ILM. Hence, Box 6 cases, like Burns, are most likely to arise in 
the context of subcontracting, when the physical assets employed in 
the ILM belong largely to the contractor and thus are retained with 
the workers. 
2. Box 5: Obligations Under the CBA After a Shift of Work 
The rule of Box 5 is that, after a shift of work, the new employer 
need not follow the old CBA.187 Suppose, however, that the new em-
ployer hires all of the loser's employees and deploys them in the same 
way doing the same work. Why is there no more than a slight and 
easily rebuttable presumption in favor of the old collective bargaining 
agreement? 
As with Box 6, the ILM considerations that justify the Column 2 
boxes largely carry over. Because of the reduced danger of opportu-
nistic behavior, however, those considerations become even more pow-
erful. The paradigm Box 5 case is the potentially efficient ILM, that 
is, an ILM that is otherwise productive except, say, for uncompeti-
tively high wage premiums. Permitting the Box 5 employer unilater-
ally to set initial terms maximizes the chances of preserving such 
ILMs to the mutual benefit of the firm, the employees, and society. 
Imposing the duty to bargain protects employees from Case C oppor-
tunistic behavior. By contrast, imposing the old CBA as the initial 
terms would doom borderline ILMs to unnecessary extinction. 
In Burns, the fact that Burns could offer a lower price for the 
Lockheed contract and still hire a sufficient number of guards to pro-
vide the services to Lockheed provides substantial evidence that, while 
the Wackenhut ILM was fundamentally sound, the wages paid under 
the contract rendered Wackenhut uncompetitive. By permitting 
Burns to hire the employees, at a lower wage, the Court allowed for 
the preservation of the potentially efficient Wackenhut ILM. Impos-
ing the duty to bargain on Burns protected the former Wackenhut 
guards from any attempt by Burns to capture a disproportionate share 
of the joint surplus generated by their joint activities. 
187. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text. 
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D. Remaining Puzzles 
The preceding account of labor law successorship doctrine leaves 
several puzzles. First, we distinguish between Case B and Case C on 
the grounds that in Case B, but not in Case C, the new firm's represen-
tation that the ILM is defective is self-enforcing. This raises the ques-
tion why, in Case C, employees would believe such a representation. 
The firm's failure in Case C to put its money where its mouth is makes 
its statement inherently suspect. 
The answer is related to information asymmetries. While the 
firm's representation might not be credible given full information, em-
ployees lack full information. The firm's information as to the margi-
nal product of the workers is partly private, depending on product 
prices and technology (known to the firm) and worker effort (known 
to the employees). This asymmetry of information and the associated 
potential for opportunistic behavior, we argue, partly explains why 
parties in a low transaction cost setting would adopt the labor law 
successorship doctrine. 
But opportunistic behavior may still occur, even under an optimal 
labor law successorship regime. At best, labor law successorship doc-
trine will maintain and protect a bargaining process. Because the ILM 
creates a bilateral monopoly, however, the outcome of that bargaining 
process - the division of the joint surplus - will depend on the rela-
tive bargaining abilities of the parties. In this process, shrewd negotia-
tors for a firm may successfully manipulate information to argue 
credibly that product market conditions are adverse when they in fact 
are favorable, thereby increasing the firm's share. 
The second puzzle is related to the first. In the corporate law 
cases, the law views creditors as largely able to protect themselves by 
contract. Unknown future claimants represent the principal excep-
tion: they cannot protect themselves because they do not know they 
even have a claim, much less its magnitude, and typically lack a con-
tractual relationship with the firm. But why do we also treat employ-
ees differently? Unlike future products liability claimants, employees 
do have an ongoing contractual relationship with the firm. Why 
should the law do anything more than enforce the CBA?188 
One answer is unpersuasive. Some have argued that the relative 
absence of explicit contractual protection stems from employee igno-
rance of the problem of asset purchasers behaving opportunistically. 189 
If the problem were one of asymmetric information, however, it would 
188. 406 U.S. at 304-06 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
189. Hylton & Hylton, supra note 5, at 849-50. 
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be self-correcting. As opportunistic behavior becomes known, the hy-
pothesis of continued ignorance becomes less credible. Moreover, it is 
inconsistent with the presence of successorship protection in some col-
lective bargaining agreements. 
A more persuasive justification for this protection is that collective 
action problems among employees make it difficult to contract for the 
efficient level of protection. While union leadership may understand 
the problem of successorship, explaining this problem to the rank and 
file may prove difficult, especially in terms of a trade-off against wages. 
This account predicts and is consistent with the casual observation 
that explicit successorship protection is more common in national con-
tracts - where the rank and file has relatively less impact - than in 
single plant contracts.190 
The primary explanation for these legal protections, however, is 
that the ILM is a continuing relationship. While the CBA has a termi-
nation date, the parties' understanding is that contract expiration is 
primarily a time to reset or update some of the parameters of the 
agreement. Since the parties do not view termination of a CBA, and 
any intervals between CBAs, as an end to the relationship, the parties 
retain an ongoing duty to bargain to form a new contract. The duty to 
bargain continues as long as the relationship remains intact and a new 
owner who retains the ILM does not disturb that duty. This con-
tinuity preserves productive ILMs and thereby benefits both the new 
employer and the workers. 
CONCLUSION 
The labor law successorship doctrine has bedeviled courts and la-
bor law commentators for years. To many, it has seemed arbitrary, 
formalistic, and morally wrong. Traditional labor law scholars, using 
traditional labor law categories, have been unable to explain or predict 
its development or provide any sort of justification for its peculiar 
features. 
In this article, we have started from the very formalism that the 
traditional commentators have rejected - the corporate law distinc-
tion between mergers and asset sales. From that distinction, and from 
a more general analysis of corporate successorship doctrine, we have 
generated a taxonomy that organizes the doctrine. 
Once we organize the doctrine by reference to corporate law's 
analysis of successorship, we can explain the differences between the 
190. Discussion at the University of Pennsylvania's Institute for Law and Economics Labor 
Law Roundtable (May l, 1992). 
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two bodies of law by focusing on the differences in the relationship 
between employees and the firm and others who contract with the 
firm. What distinguishes the employee-firm relationship is the exist-
ence of ILMs, which, because of match-specific investments, create the 
potential for ongoing joint profits or surpluses above those offered by 
ELMs. This potential for continuing profits, however, also creates a 
greater potential for opportunistic, rent-seeking behavior. By analyz-
ing labor law successorship doctrine from the ILM perspective, with 
its focus on the forward-looking creation of joint surplus, we can ex-
plain why employees receive greater protection in stock and asset sales 
than creditors receive generally. At the same time, ILM considera-
tions explain why even greater protections, the sort favored by many 
labor law commentators who use the standard labor paradigm, are not 
only unnecessary but also potentially harmful to the joint interests of 
the firm and the workers. 
But the ILM perspective alone does not fully explain the complexi-
ties of labor successorship doctrine. A full explanation also requires 
the application of the corporate law paradigm. This paradigm distin-
guishes between stock sales and mergers - as the standard form 
mechanism for transferring a whole business as a going concern - on 
the one hand, and asset sales - as the standard form for transferring 
businesses piecemeal - on the other. 
The relevance of the corporate law paradigm explains why Wi-
ley 191 was only the first of many cases in labor law successorship. The 
Wiley doctrine could not be applied broadly, as both advocated and 
predicted by traditional labor law commentators. The Wiley issue of 
contract enforcement following a merger fundamentally differs from 
the issues that arise in the absence of a contract (Box 2) and from 
those that arise after an asset sale (Boxes 3 and 4). At the same time, 
we show why Wiley, correctly interpreted, has never been overturned 
or even limited. It was at the time, and remains today, the correct rule 
for Box 1 cases. 
The relevance of the corporate law paradigm also shows why the 
Court's assertion in Howard Johnson 192 that the nature of the corpo-
rate transaction was not a central feature of that case was misplaced. 
Even when lower courts put the substance of the substantial continuity 
doctrine ahead of the form of the corporate transaction, they find that 
the form of the transaction predicts the correct application of the sub-
stantial continuity doctrine. Form and substance are closely related. 
191. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). 
192. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974). 
260 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:203 
To explain the curious application of successorship doctrine to 
Column 3 shift of work cases, however, the corporate law paradigm is 
of only limited help. Only the theory of the ILM, which sees the po-
tential for future profits in continuing ILMs, adequately explains the 
need for protection in such contexts. The substantial continuity of the 
ILM in Burns 193 is initially a puzzle because the new owner neither 
purchased the stock nor the assets of the predecessor. The explanation 
for this puzzle is that many of the ILM's physical assets were owned 
by the contractor, Lockheed. When Lockheed shifted the work from 
Wackenhut to Burns, the impact on the ILM was almost identical to 
an asset sale. 
This article illustrates the power of economics to cast light on simi-
lar legal doctrines that develop in related fields. Capital and labor are 
two of the principal inputs to the firm. Both corporate law and labor 
law address the problem of successorship, of the extent to which those 
who acquire the firm in whole or in part must assume the obligations 
of the seller. We show in this article that many of the differences in 
labor and corporate law's treatment of successorship derive from fun-
damental economic differences in the firm's relationship with credi-
tors, as suppliers of capital, and its relationship with employees, as 
suppliers of labor. 
193. NLRB v. Burns Intl. Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972). 
